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The qui tam action offers an unconventional means by which Congress
may enlist the aid of private citizens in enforcing Federal statutory
schemes.' In such an action, a private person maintains a civil proceeding
on behalf of both herself and the United States to recover damages and/or
to enforce penalties available under a statute prohibiting specified conduct.
The private plaintiff shares any monetary recovery with the United
States.
Despite its relative obscurity today, the qui tam enforcement framework
is familiar to our legal tradition. "Statutes providing for actions by a com-
mon informer, who himself has no interest whatever in the controversy
other than that given by statute, have been in existence for hundreds of
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1. The phrase "qui tam" is shorthand for "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se imposo se-
quitur," interpreted as "who brings the action as well for the king as for himself." Bass Anglers
Sportsman's Soc'y of Am. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 302, 305 (S.D. Tex.
1971). Qui tam plaintiffs are also frequently referred to as "informers" or "relators."
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years in England, and in this country ever since the foundation of our
Government."2 Indeed, qui tam actions were routinely authorized by the
First and subsequent early Congresses,' and as late as the turn of this
century, the Supreme Court recognized that the "right to recover the pen-
alty or forfeiture granted by statute is frequently given to the first com-
mon informer who brings the action, although he has no interest in the
matter whatever except as such informer."4
Most early qui tam statutes have long been repealed; of those remain-
ing, most lie essentially dormant.5 For the past few decades, Congress has
chosen a different means by which to enlist the aid of private citizens in
supplementing executive branch enforcement of Federal statutes: the "citi-
zens' suit." By this device, Congress legislatively defines legal interests
(overlaying those already established at common law) and authorizes pri-
2. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.4 (1943) (citation omitted); see
Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement? 78 YALE L.J. 816,
825-27 (1969) (highlighting early history of qui tam actions in pre- and post-revolutionary America);
Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371,
1406-09 (1988) (same); cf. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons
from History, 38 Am. U.L. REV. 275, 296-303 (1989) (early American employment of qui tam ac-
tions designed to supplement criminal law enforcement).
While historically the "colonies and the states employed informers' statutes in a wide variety of
cases," Winter, supra, at 1406, and various states still employ the qui tam concept today, see, e.g.,
False Claims Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12650-12655 (Deering 1988), I focus here solely on Federal
qui tam statutes because they uniquely raise Federal constitutional concerns.
3. See, e.g., Adams, qui tam, v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 341 (1805) ("Almost every fine or
forfeiture under a penal statute, may be recovered by an action of debt [by qui tam plaintiffs] as well
as by information [by the public prosecutor].").
The First Congress employed qui tam actions in various forms and contexts. Six statutes imposed
penalties and/or forfeitures for conduct injurious to the general public and expressly authorized suits
by private informers, with the recovery being shared between the informer and the United States. Act
of Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 2, § 3, 1 Stat. 101, 102 (marshals' misfeasance in census-taking); Act of July 5,
1790, ch. 25, § 1, 1 Stat. 129 (same); Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, § 4, 1 Stat. 131, 133 (harboring
runaway mariners); Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 3, 1 Stat. 137, 137-38 (unlicensed Indian trade);
Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, §§ 8, 9, 1 Stat. 191, 195-96 (unlawful trades or loans by Bank of United
States subscribers); Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 44, 1 Stat. 199, 209 (avoidance of liquor import
duties).
Three statutes similarly imposing penalties and/or forfeitures for conduct injurious to the general
public authorized informers bringing successful prosecutions to keep the entire recovery. Act of July
31, 1789, ch. 5, § 29, 1 Stat. 29, 44-45 (import duty collectors' failure to post accurate rates); Act of
Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, § 21, 1 Stat. 55, 60 (failure to register vessels properly); Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch.
35, § 55, 1 Stat. 145, 173 (import duty collectors' failure to post accurate rates).
Two other qui tam statutes imposed penalties and/or forfeitures for conduct injurious both to the
general public and more concretely to a subclass thereof. One allowed any person to sue, Act of July
20, 1790, ch. 29, § 1, 1 Stat. 131, 131 (failure of vessel commander to contract with mariners); and
the other allowed suits by anyone whose private rights were violated, Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, §
2, 1 Stat. 124, 124-25 (copyright infringement).
4. Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905).
5. Two nineteenth-century statutes explicitly authorizing qui tam actions remain on the books but
are rarely invoked. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 39, 16 Stat. 198, 203 (false marking of patented
articles) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) (1982)); Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 27, 4 Stat.
729, 733-34 (regulating Indian trade) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 201 (1982)).
See also Act of Mar. 3, 1825, ch. 107, § 3, 4 Stat. 132, 133 (forfeiture of vessels taking undersea
treasure from Florida coast to foreign nations; no express authorization for private suit, but recovery
shared between informer and United States) (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 723 (1982)); Act of June
5, 1794, ch. 50, § 3, 1 Stat. 381, 383 (forfeiture of vessels privately armed against friendly nations;
same enforcement provisions) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 962 (1982)).
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vate citizens to protect these interests through litigation seeking monetary
and/or injunctive relief against persons invading them.' Most such citi-
zens' suits supplant executive branch enforcement by compelling alleged
wrongdoers' compliance with statutory directives, while other such suits
compel the executive itself to enforce public law obligations against sus-
pected wrongdoers.7 Individuals bringing suits of either type are often
called "private attorneys general," because Congress intends their individ-
ual actions, when aggregated, to benefit the public at large by effectuating
important Federal policies.
Despite this trend towards policing the public interest through citizens'
suits, Congress recently revitalized the qui tam framework in the False
Claims Act,8 which imposes civil liability upon persons presenting false
claims for payment to or otherwise defrauding the Federal treasury.9
Since its original enactment in 1863,0 the Act has authorized both public
law enforcement officers and all private citizens to sue on behalf of the
United States to recover damages and civil penalties for such fraudulent
acts and to share in the recovery."1 Restrictive statutory amendments and
judicial interpretations of the Act drove qui tam actions into a period of
desuetude for much of this century.12 But in 1986, realizing that the battle
6. Congress' authorization of such citizens' suits is most pervasive in the field of environmental
protection. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982); Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982).
Congress has also statutorily created private causes of action in many different fields to redress
injuries already recognized at common law. See, e.g., Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26
(1982); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
7. Compare, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1982) (authoriz-
ing private suits against polluters to compel compliance) with id. § 1365(a)(2) (authorizing private
suits against EPA to compel performance of mandatory enforcement duties). See generally Stewart &
Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1195 (1982) (characterizing and
comparing "private rights of action," meaning suits against alleged private wrongdoers to secure their
compliance with Federal law, with "private rights of initiation," meaning suits against executive offi-
cials to enjoin them to bring public enforcement actions against alleged private wrongdoers).
Both private rights of action and private rights of initiation vary considerably in formal structure.
For example, while some statutes authorizing private rights of action vest exclusive and plenary power
in private citizens over whether to initiate and how to conduct such actions, e.g., Clayton Antitrust
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1982), other statutes afford the executive branch substantial authority to
participate in-or even preempt-privately initiated litigation. See, e.g., Comment, Environmental
Law-Citizen Suits and Recovery of Civil Penalties, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 529, 533-35 (1988) (dis-
cussing EPA's statutory entitlement to advance notification of intended citizens' suits under various
environmental statutes and its authority to preempt such suits by filing its own first).
8. 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 3729-3731 (West Supp. 1989).
9. Id. § 3729.
10. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696. The False Claims Act was reenacted as Rev. Stat.
§§ 3490-3494, 5438 (1875 ed.); later codified as 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-235; and finally recodified in 1982
as 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731.
11. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(a) & (b) (West Supp. 1989). The specific enforcement structure of the
Act is explained infra at text accompanying notes 40-60.
12. For example, because of perceived abuse of the qui tam reward structure by "informers" who
in fact copied all of their information from government documents, Congress in 1943 imposed severe
jurisdictional restrictions on qui tam suits. See generally United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729
F.2d 1100, 1103-06 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing abuse and legislative response). Moreover, the Act's
failure to guarantee successful qui tam plaintiffs a minimum share in the recovery, along with judicial
interpretations of the Act imposing a "clear and convincing" burden of persuasion and requiring proof
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against government fraud could not effectively be waged without private
soldiers, Congress reinvigorated the Act's qui tam framework to enlist the
knowledge and resources of the citizenry to supplement public law en-
forcement efforts."3
From Congress' perspective, qui tam statutes and the more familiar cit-
izens' suit provisions serve the same purpose: Both are designed to en-
courage private citizens to help the executive branch deter and redress
violations of Federal law. One might question the wisdom of dual public
and private enforcement in general or the context or structure of particu-
lar such schemes.14 But Congress' authority to determine that dual en-
forcement constitutes wise social policy, and to implement that decision by
enacting traditional citizens' suits provisions, is beyond serious dispute.
The Supreme Court repeatedly has held that "Congress may enact stat-
utes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing" for the
injured party to sue for redress.15 For many decades, courts have enter-
tained suits brought by private citizens to vindicate legislatively defined
interests, recognizing constitutional constraints on Congress' power to au-
thorize such suits only at the extreme margin. 6
In contrast to the traditional citizens' suit scheme, the constitutional sta-
tus of qui tam enforcement remains unsettled. Indeed, defendants in re-
cent qui tam suits brought to enforce the False Claims Act presently are
challenging its constitutionality." Their attack is premised upon an as-
of "specific intent" to defraud, also contributed to the action's virtual dormancy throughout the past
half-century. See S. REP. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5266 [hereinafter S. REP.].
13. The 1986 amendments, inter alia, relaxed the jurisdictional bar against qui tam actions based
on information already known to the government, increased bath the damages and penalties recover-
able and a successful private plaintiff's minimum and maximum share thereof, embraced a "prepon-
derance of the evidence" burden of persuasion, and eschewed any requirement of specific intent to
defraud. See False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 3729-3731 (West Supp. 1989).
14. For example, debate continues over whether dual enforcement schemes lead to overdeterrence
of benign conduct, overinvestment of social resources in the collective law enforcement effort, and/or
fragmented or inconsistent policy implementation through decentralized litigation control. See, e.g.,
Crumplar, An Alternative To Public and Victim Enforcement of the Federal Securities and Anti-
trust Laws: Citizen Enforcement, 13 HARV. J. LEGIS. 76 (1975); Graham, The Qui Tam Amend-
ments: Privatizing the Civil Prosecution Function, 49 FED. CONT. REP. (BNA) 659 (Apr. 4, 1989);
Landes & Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975); Mashaw, Private
Enforcement of Public Regulatory Provisions: The "Citizen Suit," 4 CLASS ACrION REP. 29 (1975);
Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 7.
15. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973).
16. Contemporary Article III standing doctrine suggests that some legislatively defined interests
may be insufficiently "distinct and palpable" or otherwise inappropriate for judicial cognizance. See
discussion infra Section III. But see infra text accompanying notes 198-99 (arguing that, with limited
exceptions, such doctrinal constraints on adjudication of legislatively defined interests are conceptually
unfounded and ought to be discarded).
17. When I wrote this Comment, defendants had raised this issue in some form in several qui tam
suits under the False Claims Act, but only one court had ruled on such a motion, rejecting in a one-
sentence order a narrow form of the more generic constitutional challenge. See United States ex rel.
Gravitt v. General Elec. Co., No. C-1-84-1610 (C.D. Ohio Jan. 3, 1989) (unpublished order). Since
the Comment went into production, the constitutional challenge has been considered and rejected in
United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., No. CV 87-1840-WDK (Gx) (C.D. Cal.
June 1, 1989); in United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., No. C 88-20009
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serted distinction in the nature of the legal interests underlying traditional
private attorney general and qui tam actions. In a citizens' suit, private
plaintiffs are conventionally understood to represent interests granted per-
sonally to them by Congress."8 "The wrongs alleged and the relief sought
by such a plaintiff are unmistakably private; only secondarily are his in-
terests representative of those of the general population."' 9 But in the par-
adigmatic qui tam suit, private plaintiffs are conventionally understood to
represent, not interests granted personally to them, but rather legal inter-
ests granted by Congress to the public at large: "in qui tam actions .. .
society makes individuals the representatives of the public for the purpose
of enforcing a policy explicitly formulated by legislation."20 The qui tam
litigant is not personally injured by the defendant's challenged conduct;
her interest in the litigation arises rather from the statutory bounty offered
for successful prosecution.2 '
Critics of the qui tam concept contend that this posited distinction be-
tween private and public interest representation makes a constitutional
difference. While private citizens may represent their own interests in fed-
eral court, these critics contend, the Constitution prohibits Congress from
empowering self-selected and financially self-interested private citizens to
represent the interests of the entire polity in Federal litigation.
RPA (N.D. Cal. June 12, 1989); and in United States ex rel. Troung v. Northrop Corp., No. CV 88-
967 MRP (C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 1989).
18. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982) ("any citizen may
commence a civil action on his own behalf").
19. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 117 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
20. Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 418 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
I refer to the "paradigmatic" qui tam action because, while there is a historical correlation between
employment of the qui tam enforcement concept and legislative protection of interests fairly character-
ized as "public" in nature, there is no analytic connection between the two. In theory, Congress might
allow citizens to bring qui tam suits to remedy injuries more fairly characterized as discrete and
personal. Cf. Crumplar, supra note 14 (proposing qui tam enforcement of Federal securities laws).
Indeed, in isolated circumstances, the First Congress enacted qui tam statutes in such contexts. See
supra note 3. In practice, however, Congress' historical employment of the qui tam enforcement
scheme has been closely associated with the protection of interests shared by the public at large.
I focus on the paradigmatic qui tam action in this Comment rather than on public actions generally
both because of the posture of the present constitutional challenge and because the bounty aspect of
the qui tam scheme simultaneously raises a few unique constitutional concerns and satisfies a few
others.
21. See Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1965) (paradigmatic qui tam plaintiff "has no
interest in the matter whatever except as such informer").
Thus understood, qui tam authorization can be characterized as a "whistleblowing" enforcement
strategy, whereby erstwhile bystanders to transactions are given incentives to detect and report (and
here prosecute) suspected misconduct. See generally Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a
Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. L., EcON., & ORG. 53 (1986) (distinguishing between
"whistleblowing" enforcement strategies and "gatekeeping" enforcement strategies, which impose
"collateral" legal liability on transactional participants who are not themselves primary authors or
beneficiaries of misconduct but who are in a position to detect potential misconduct by others and
prevent it by withholding their support). The oversight function of qui tam plaintiffs qua
"whistleblowers" and "gatekeepers" is the same, though the incentives employed differ as do carrots
and sticks; qui tam plaintiffs are given bounties for successful detection and prosecution, whereas
conventional gatekeepers are sanctioned for unsuccessful detection and deterrence. Professor Kraak-
man notes that, at present, "whistleblowing duties are extremely rare, while gatekeeping duties are
common." Id. at 58 n.11.
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Two different constitutional doctrines are said to require this result.
First, "[a]n enforcement remedy being pursued solely to protect the public
interest, as distinguished from a private attorney general action with pub-
lic interest overtones, is exclusively within the province of the Executive
Branch."22 Therefore, Article II of the Constitution precludes Congress
from sharing the executive's assigned function of public law enforcement
with self-interested and unaccountable private citizens. Second, private lit-
igants lack a "distinct and palpable" personal interest in the controversy
underlying a qui tam action and therefore are disqualified from litigation
by Article III's standing requirements. Like the first, this second doctrinal
challenge posits that courts may entertain enforcement actions designed to
protect solely the public interest only when such actions are initiated by
the executive.
I note at the outset that the distinction between private and public in-
terest representation, which for purposes of these two doctrinal challenges
purportedly distinguishes between the accepted citizens' suit and the sus-
pect qui tam suit, is conceptually infirm. Because the public is composed
of individuals, any injury to the "public at large" can easily be reconcep-
tualized as an injury to each constituent member, albeit one that is ubiq-
uitous and perhaps intangible in nature.2 3 There exists no pre-legal, em-
pirical sense in which a particular injury must be viewed as inherently
"public" in nature.24 While injuries may fairly be placed on a descriptive
private/public spectrum according to the directness of their impact on in-
dividuals, with the paradigmatic citizens' suit falling somewhat towards
the private end and the paradigmatic qui tam action falling towards the
public end,25 drawing a particular line between "private" and "public"
actions for purposes of constitutional doctrine requires normative, not fac-
tual, justification.26
22. Lewis, Environmentalists' Authority to Sue Industry for Civil Penalties Is Unconstitutional
Under the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 16 ENVTL, L. RE!'. 10101, 10104 (1986).
23. The Supreme Court has often entertained suits alleging "personal" injuries that are both
ubiquitously shared and intangible. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)
(implicitly recognizing personal interest in preservation of endangered species); Sierra Club v. Mor-
ton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) (recognizing personal "aesthetic" and "conservational" interests in
environmental protection); cf. Mashaw, supra note 14, at 31 (noting that "both public and private
law rules of conduct have at their core notions of the general public interest").
24. Cf Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1432, 1436
n.18 (1988) ("There is no prepolitical or prelegal way to decide who is a bystander [as opposed to one
whose personal legal interests are invaded by misconduct]; the term is a function of law, not of any-
thing in the world that is independent of the legal system.").
25. See supra note 20.
26. For example, whether an asserted injury is sufficiently "distinct and palpable" to confer Arti-
cle III standing turns on the purposes of the doctrinal requirement. See infra text accompanying notes
193-94.
The same conceptual line-drawing difficulties arise when one attempts to ground a public/private
distinction in the nature of relief sought in particular suits, as opposed to the nature of the interests
sought to be protected. For example, from the perspective of the relief sought, antitrust suits to recover
private damages may seem more "private" in nature than suits to recover civil penalties payable to the
Federal treasury. But many types of suits would seem to occupy some middle position on this descrip-
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For present purposes, however, I am willing to set aside my general
quarrel with the conceptual public/private distinction underlying the qui
tam challenge and instead indulge the premise that qui tam litigants re-
present interests belonging solely to the public at large rather than their
own personal legal interests. Given this starting point, both the Article II
and Article III challenges to qui tam authorization raise a common in-
quiry: Who is entitled to define the interests of the national polity for the
purpose of engaging in litigation on its behalf? By tradition, if not by
constitutional design, we tend to assume that the United States' interests2"
in enforcing Federal law through litigation are properly represented by
the executive branch. Whether this assumption is valid in particular con-
texts,28 and what follows from it,2 remain largely unexplored questions.
tive spectrum, including private suits for broad injunctive relief benefiting the public at large; citizens'
suits seeking both injunctive relief and monetary penalties payable to the Federal treasury, see, e.g.,
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(d), 1365(a) (1982); and, of course, qui tam
suits seeking monetary recovery to be shared by the Federal treasury and the private litigant. Even the
treble damages aspect of private antitrust suits and punitive damage awards in private civil litigation
may fairly be characterized as providing a public-oriented remedy of enhanced deterrence rather than
a private-oriented remedy to compensate for personal economic injury. Cf Browning-Ferris Indus. v.
Kelco Disposal, 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2920 (1989) (punitive damages advance "governmental interests...
of punishment and deterrence").
Indeed, the difficulty of defining a pre-legal distinction between "private" and "public" actions
often is compounded when one focuses simultaneously on both the nature of the underlying legal
interest and the nature of the remedial scheme. How ought we characterize a citizens' suit brought
under various environmental statutes, which seems to allege injury to a personal interest in pollution
avoidance, when the litigant must first notify Federal and state authorities who can then preempt
private litigation by filing an action of their own? See supra note 7.
27. Unless otherwise stated, I refer to the United States, the national polity, and the public inter-
changeably. See infra text accompanying notes 35-39 (explaining equation).
28. This assumption is certainly dubious when the executive branch intervenes in litigation to
challenge the constitutionality of Federal legislation on the ground that the legislation infringes on the
executive's constitutional prerogatives. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). By mak-
ing this argument, the executive branch appears to be representing its own institutional interests,
rather than purporting to define and then represent the broader interests of the national polity. See
Miller & Bowman, Presidential Attacks on the Constitutionality of Federal Statutes: A New Separa-
tion of Powers Problem, 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 51 (1979) (discussing constitutionality and propriety of
executive attacks on statutes); cf United States v. Providence Journal Co., 108 S. Ct. 1502, 1510
(1988) (executive official representing United States in Supreme Court litigation expected to speak
"with a voice that reflects not the parochial interests of a particular agency, but the common interests
of the Government and therefore of all the people").
Of course, one might attempt to equate the two sets of interests by defining the preeminent interest
of the polity to be the avoidance of unconstitutional governmental behavior; then the executive's con-
stitutional challenge to legislation as infringing upon executive prerogatives serves this national inter-
est. But all branches of government are responsible in various contexts for assessing the constitutional-
ity of legislation, see Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443, 445-46 & n.12 (1989) (citing examples and canvassing scholarship),
and Congress and the judiciary may have views that differ from those of the executive as to the proper
understanding of executive prerogatives. Why should the executive branch's view "count" as the one
best implementing the United States' hypothesized preeminent interest in constitutional observance? It
seems to me that the executive branch in such cases cannot meaningfully be said to represent the
"United States" as opposed merely to itself. Cf Providence Journal Co., 108 S. Ct. at 1514 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("When faced with a difference of view between the Executive Branch and a coordinate
branch of government . . . the Solicitor General [charged with representing the "interests of the
United States" before the Supreme Court) faces a conflict of interest that undeniably would be intoler-
able if encountered in the private sector."). Rather, the "United States" essentially goes unrepresented
or, arguably, is represented by the judicial branch, which is assigned the responsibility in our tripar-
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The question whether the qui tam concept conforms to contemporary con-
stitutional doctrines reflects a specific variation on this larger theme: Does
the Constitution empower only the executive branch to define and then
secure through Federal litigation the interests of the United States with
respect to particular public grievances, or does our "constitutional system
[which] imposes upon the Branches a degree of overlapping responsibil-
ity"30 permit Congress to diffuse this power by authorizing private citi-
zens to represent the United States in Federal litigation?
I explore this question here by identifying the constitutional values po-
tentially threatened by the qui tam device and by analyzing the validity
and persuasive force of the arguments they inspire. I conclude that the
authorization of qui tam actions remains a constitutionally acceptable
means by which Congress may shape and secure the interests of the
United States. With only limited exceptions, important constitutional val-
ues underlying Articles II and III are no more threatened by "public" qui
tam actions than by conventional "private" citizens' suits. And the few
exceptions are relatively trivial and/or adequately addressed by various
features of the qui tam concept in general or the False Claims Act in
particular. The lesson to be learned, therefore, is that Congress' power to
create new legal interests enforceable by private citizens in Federal court
is not bounded by a public/private distinction; Congress may entitle pri-
vate citizens through qui tam actions to enforce legal interests granted the
United States on its behalf."'
tite government for assessing the constitutionality of government behavior in particular cases and
controversies.
29. For example, may the executive branch, absent legislative authorization, bring suit in Federal
court? Compare United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1980) (executive has no
nonstatutory standing to enforce Fourteenth Amendment rights of individuals) with id. at 207 (Gib-
bons, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing). See generally Note, Nonstatutory Executive Authority
to Bring Suit, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1566 (1972) (arguing that executive ought to enjoy nonstatutory
standing only in specified "emergencies"). And if so, can Congress expressly prohibit this practice
under certain conditions? See, e.g., United States v. Marion County School Dist., 625 F.2d 607, 611
(5th Cir. 1980) (answering in the affirmative). And, for these purposes, should it matter whether the
executive purports to represent its own institutional interests or rather the overall interests of the
United States?
30. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 659 (1989).
31. This conclusion has ramifications extending well beyond the constitutional defense of a single
qui tam statute. Should qui tam enforcement of the False Claims Act ultimately be viewed as a
successful strategy for effectuating Federal objectives, Congress likely will experiment with alternative
versions of the concept in different substantive legal contexts. For example, as suggested to me by
Professor Peter Schuck, Congress might enforce Federal immigration law by authorizing qui tam suits
against persons knowingly employing unauthorized immigrants. See also Crumplar, supra note 14
(proposing qui tam enforcement of Federal securities laws); Note, Domestic Covert Action and the
Need for National Security Qui Tam Prosecutions, 16 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207 (1989) (proposing qui
tam enforcement of laws and regulations constraining domestic covert action undertaken by executive
agencies). While I focus on the constitutional validity of the False Claims Act's contemporary version
of the concept, my analysis implicitly establishes a framework for evaluating the validity of continuing
efforts to privatize enforcement of Federal laws, both through alternative versions and applications of
the qui tam concept, and through various unconventional versions of the citizens' suit model. Cf, e.g.,
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Outboard Marine Corp., 692 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. II1. 1988)
(rejecting Article II challenge-similar to that advanced against the qui tam concept-to provision of
Qui Tam Actions
I. THE NATURE OF Qui Tam REPRESENTATION OF THE UNITED
STATES
Given the uniqueness of the qui tam litigation concept, the nature and
relationship of the interests and parties involved are not self-evident. Eval-
uating the contemporary constitutional status of the qui tam framework
therefore requires first exploring its various facets in greater detail. In this
section I explore the relationship created by qui tam litigation among the
United States, the executive branch, and private plaintiffs.
A. The Injury to the United States
The False Claims Act was originally enacted to "stop[] the massive
frauds perpetrated [against the Union Army] by large [defense] contrac-
tors during the Civil War." 2 Some things never change: Today, "perhaps
ten percent of the Federal budget is being lost each year due to fraud
against the taxpayers,"3 and there are "indications of massive procure-
ment abuses occurring in the recent military buildup."3
Illegal false claims practices injure the entire public in several ways.
Because "the United States holds its general funds [in the Federal trea-
sury] . . . as surrogate for the population at large,"35 each member of the
public is injured by the loss of financial resources that were generated by
the public (primarily through taxes) and intended to be spent on the pub-
lic's behalf. Financial concerns aside, false claims practices may generate
other diffuse injuries, including threats to national security.3 6
The False Claims Act's authorization of litigation on behalf and in the
name of the United States"7 reflects the understanding that the United
States, as "sovereign," represents the interests of the public at large.3 8
Through litigation, the United States attempts to redress the public inju-
Federal Water Pollution Control Act authorizing citizens to seek monetary penalties payable to Fed-
eral treasury).
I intend in the future to provide a more complete account of the related constitutional issues raised
by the entire range of current and proposed versions of private Federal law enforcement schemes by
developing and defending a more comprehensive theoretical constitutional framework than space and
time considerations permit here.
32. United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 309 (1976).
33. 134 CONG. REC. S16,705 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1988) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
34. 132 CONG. REc. H6479 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Brooks).
35. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
36. For example, certain types of military contractor fraud (e.g., falsely certifying compliance with
required performance or safety standards) do much more than undermine the economic value of goods
procured; they also potentially threaten the nation's military security. See S. REP., supra note 12, at 3
(many false claims practices in military procurement "cause[] not only a serious threat to human life,
but also to national security"). Both to deter such non-economic injuries and to deter the mere provi-
sion of false information, which is considered to be a public evil in itself, the False Claims Act estab-
lishes liability and imposes civil penalties even when a defendant's submission of false claims to the
United States results in no monetary loss. See id. at 8.
37. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(b).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 27 (1960) ("Congress [may] authorize the
United States to be the guardian of th[e] public interest in a suit for injunctive relief.").
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ries created by false claims practices, both by recouping siphoned treasury
funds and by deterring future threats to economic and national security."9
B. Representation of the United States Through Litigation
1. The Qui Tam Enforcement Scheme
The "United States" can act only through the agency of persons. Qui
tam provisions establish a dual enforcement scheme whereby both public
officials and private citizens are permitted to represent the United States
in litigation to enforce statutory mandates. The False Claims Act permits
the executive branch, namely the Department of Justice (DOJ), to litigate
on behalf of the United States. The DOJ may file its own actions, 0 and it
enjoys exclusive and plenary control over such litigation.41
But concerned that Federal officials, acting alone, cannot adequately
protect the United States' interest in remedying and deterring fraud, Con-
gress has also authorized any private citizen to initiate litigation and to
share in any resulting recovery.42 First, Congress recognized that detecting
fraud against the Federal treasury often is extremely difficult for the gov-
ernment without the aid of "informers," both because individuals do not
suffer personal injuries sufficiently palpable to provoke complaints, and
because often the only persons who know about frauds are associated with
the perpetrators (usually subordinates, but sometimes unwilling partici-
pants) and are therefore reluctant to notify the authorities."
In addition, given the "harsh reality of today's funding limitations of
• ..the budgets of the government's prosecuting agencies," 44 public offi-
cials often cannot commit the time and resources necessary for the success-
39. Because the economic injury to the public is filtered through the Federal treasury, the role of
the United States as plaintiff in a False Claims Act suit arguably may be characterized in an alterna-
tive manner. If one conceives of the United States government as owning the funds in the Federal
treasury, then it may sue in a "proprietary" as opposed to "sovereign" capacity to protect its "per-
sonal" pecuniary interests.
I find this perspective wanting, both because I agree with Justice Harlan's view that the treasury
belongs to the public and because this perspective fails to account for the non-pecuniary injuries
potentially generated by false claims practices. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36. More im-
portantly for my purposes here, this perspective diverges from the traditional application of the qui
tam concept in which the United States clearly acted in a sovereign rather than proprietary capacity.
See, e.g., Flast, 392 U.S. at 120 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing qui tam actions as examples of suits
brought by private citizens solely as " 'representatives of the public interest' ") (quoting Scripps-
Howard Radio v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1941)); Priebe & Sons v. United
States, 332 U.S. 407, 418 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (same).
In any case, the sovereign/proprietary distinction is not important for present purposes because it
does not influence the relevance or importance of the constitutional values underlying separation of
powers doctrine.
40. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(a) (West Supp. 1989).
41. Id. § 3730(b)(c).
42. Id. § 3730(b)(1), (d).
43. See S. REP., supra note 12, at 4 ("Detecting fraud is usually very difficult without the cooper-
ation of individuals who are either close observers or otherwise involved in the fraudulent activity. Yet
in the area of Government fraud, there appears to be a great unwillingness to expose illegalities.").
44. 132 CONG. REC. H9388 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep. Berman).
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ful prosecution of fraud even when they have already somehow managed
to detect it.45 Congress determined that the best solution was to "deputize
ready and able people who have knowledge of fraud against the govern-
ment to play an active and constructive role through their counsel to bring
to justice those contractors who overcharge the government." '46
Another justification underlying Congress' original decision to authorize
private enforcement may have also partly motivated Congress' recent deci-
sion to reinvigorate it. In 1863, many public officials were thought to be
intimately involved in the corrupt practices of Civil War defense contrac-
tors, and Congress feared that public law enforcement officers might
therefore hesitate to prosecute offenses diligently.4 Today a related con-
cern seems plausible. Government agencies may be sufficiently dependent
upon (or co-opted by) specific players in the military-industrial complex
that the desire to prosecute wrongdoers diligently is compromised.48
None of these purposes served by qui tam authorization would simi-
larly be served by replacing it with a reward incentive regime authorizing
the DOJ to offer informers a monetary reward for disclosing their knowl-
edge of fraudulent activities if and when the DOJ successfully litigated an
action based on their information.49 Congress determined that potential
rewards alone would not provide sufficient incentive for disclosure; many
potential informers are reluctant to come forward because they refuse to
accept the "personal and financial risk" involved absent any "confidence
in the Government's ability to remedy"'50 the misconduct, a fear rectifiable
only by allowing for participation in the litigation.5" Second, such a re-
ward regime would not utilize the resources of the private citizenry to
supplement the limited public resources with which the DOJ can enforce
the Act. Finally, such a regime would not discourage executive
complacency.
45. See, e.g., S. REP., supra note 12, at 7 ("[Plerhaps the most serious problem plaguing effective
[fraud] enforcement is a lack of resources on the part of Federal enforcement agencies. . . . Federal
auditors, investigators, and attorneys are forced to make 'screening' decisions based on resource fac-
tors. Allegations that perhaps could develop into very significant cases are often left unaddressed at the
outset. . . .") (footnote omitted).
46. 132 CONG. REC. H9388 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep. Berman).
47. See Note, Qui Tam Suits Under the Federal False Claims Act: Tool of the Private Litigant
in Public Actions, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 446, 453 n.32 (1972).
48. Cf 132 CONG. REC. H6483 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Bedell) (expressing
concern that executive branch might occasionally refuse to prosecute potentially meritorious False
Claims Act suits for inappropriate "political reasons").
49. Cf Act of Sept. 13, 1978, 31 U.S.C. § 329 (1982) (court has discretion to award portion of
criminal fine to person(s) providing information leading to conviction); Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C.
§ 411 (1982) (same).
50. S. REP., supra note 12, at 25.
51. Id. To avoid the possibility that employees who themselves "planned and initiated" a false
claims practice would bring a qui tam suit against their employers or colleagues and thereby profit
from their own misconduct (as opposed to policing the misconduct of others), Congress recently
amended the False Claims Act to eliminate for such plaintiffs the guarantee of any minimum recovery
and in extreme cases to exclude any recovery. See Major Fraud Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 4631, 4638 § 9
(Nov. 19, 1988).
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 99: 341
While providing for private initiation of lawsuits, the 1986 amendments
to the False Claims Act also offer the executive branch an opportunity to
share the responsibility for prosecuting such suits.52 After a qui tam
plaintiff files an action, the DOJ has sixty days (or more, with court con-
sent) in which to investigate the qui tam plaintiff's allegations and decide
whether to enter and direct the litigation.5" If the DOJ so elects, "it shall
have the primary responsibility for prosecuting the action, and shall not
be bound by an act of the person bringing the action." 5 ' The qui tam
plaintiff remains a party to the action,55 but she cannot dictate the DOJ's
actions or override its decisions.5
Alternatively, the DOJ may leave the primary responsibility for di-
recting the litigation to the qui tam plaintiff and monitor her progress and
performance.5" The DOJ must consent prior to any dismissal of the ac-
tion.58 And, the DOJ may change its mind and intervene at any later
date, upon a showing of good cause, to assume a more significant role in
the litigation.59 The Act therefore provides the DOJ with substantial con-
trol over qui tam litigation, even while it offers strong incentives for pri-
vate initiative.00
52. In this respect, the present qui tam structure of the False Claims Act is novel. The Act prior
to 1943, as well as all other qui tam statutes, provided that actions would be controlled exclusively by
the initiating plaintiff. Between 1943 and 1986, the False Claims Act allowed the Department of
Justice to intervene and assume exclusive responsibility for litigating qui tam actions; the original
private plaintiff could continue the prosecution only if the DOJ declined to enter or if the "United
States . . .fail[ed] to carry on such suit with due diligence . Act of Dec. 23, 1943, 57 Stat.
608-09.
53. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(b)(2)-(4) (West Supp. 1989). As of summer 1989, the DOJ had taken
over 23 qui tam suits filed under the 1986 amendments, had declined to take over 63 suits, and had
yet to take action in 69 suits. See Workers Who Turn In Bosses Use Law to Seek Big Rewards, N.Y.
Times, July 10, 1989, at Al, col. 1, at D3, col. 1.
54. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(c)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
55. Id.
56. Should the DOJ seek to dismiss or settle the case, however, the qui tam plaintiff is entitled to
notice and a hearing. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(A)-(B). In part to prevent the DOJ from dismissing private
suits without adequate justification, cf. supra note 48 and accompanying text (noting congressional
concern for prospect of executive co-optation), the Act also places substantive limitations on the DOJ's
authority to dismiss private suits. See infra note 131 (discussing such limitations).
57. Id. § 3730(c)(3).
58. Id. § 3730(b)(1).
59. Id. § 3730(c)(3).
60. A successful plaintiff is generally entitled to share 15 to 25% of the recovery if the DOJ
intervenes to assume primary responsibility for conducting the litigation and 25 to 30% if the DOJ
does not intervene, with a 10% ceiling if the suit is based upon certain publicly available information.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)-(2). Given the Act's provision for treble damages plus penalties per each false
claim, as well as the enormous scope of various alleged fraudulent schemes, a successful plaintiff's
share may run well into the million of dollars. See Workers Who Turn In Bosses Use Law to Seek Big
Rewards, supra note 53 (noting that DOJ has joined qui tam suits filed against Singer Corp. for $77
million single damages; Litton Industries for $25 million single damages; and Northrop Corp. for $20
million single damages).
Because a qui tam suit under the Act spurs executive review and perhaps prosecution of a particu-
lar complaint and yet simultaneously purports directly to enforce private compliance, the suit partakes
of various qualities of both "private rights of action" and "private rights of initiation." See supra note
7.
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2. The Representational Status of the Qui Tam Plaintiff
The False Claims Act provides that "[a] person may bring a civil action
for a violation of [the Act] for the person and for the United States Gov-
ernment. The action shall be brought in the name of the Government.""1
This modernized description of the qui tam concept62 suggests that the Act
purports to authorize private litigants to represent the United States; qui
tam suits are brought "for the person" only in the sense that the litigant
may earn a reward.13 To be sure, the Act specifies that qui tam plaintiffs
are parties in their own right,6 4 but so is the United States.6 ' Thus the
qui tam provisions apparently intend that "some of the present functions
of the Department of Justice [be] delegated to the people at large, ' 68 by
authorizing private plaintiffs to represent the United States in court.6 '
Admittedly, the fact that a qui tam action under the False Claims Act is
brought in part "for the person" allows a more familiar interpretation of
the statutory scheme. As explained above, the submission of false claims to
the Federal treasury creates at least a financial and often a more intangi-
ble injury to all members of the public. The False Claims Act might plau-
sibly be viewed as granting all citizens a statutory right to be secure from
the various injurious effects of government fraud, just as the citizens' suit
provisions of various environmental statutes are understood to grant all
citizens a statutory right to be free from injuries to intangible environmen-
tal values. 8 Indeed, members of Congress in their 1986 deliberations re-
ferred interchangeably to "qui tam" and "citizens' suits,"6 perhaps sug-
61. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(b)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
62. Cf supra note 1.
63. See 132 CONG. REC. H6482 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Berman) (personal
share "is a critical incentive and reward for persons who come forward with information, putting
themselves at risk on behalf of the Federal Treasury and American taxpayers").
The bounty offered for successful prosecution may profitably be analogized to a partial assignment
of the United States' claim. See infra text accompanying note 211.
64. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(c) (West Supp. 1989).
65. Under this view of the qui tam framework, the United States is properly understood to be a
party plaintiff in any action "no matter who brings it on its behalf." United States v. B.F. Goodrich,
41 F. Supp. 574, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); see also Minotti v. Wheaton, 630 F. Supp. 280, 282-83 (D.
Conn. 1986) (United States is co-plaintiff even before DOJ has opportunity to enter litigation);
United States ex rel. LaValley v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 625 F. Supp. 591, 594 (D.N.H. 1985)
(United States is real party plaintiff in interest without regard to DOJ's decision to enter litigation).
66. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 127 F.2d 233, 234 (3d Cir. 1942), rev'd on other
grounds, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
67. That the plaintiff is a party to the suit in her own right but simultaneously represents a
separate juridical entity is not unique to qui tam litigation; Congress has often delegated power to sue
on its behalf to a representative party, as opposed to hiring counsel to represent itself directly. See,
e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 712 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("where a majority of Congress
approves a lawsuit by expressly authorizing a member or a committee to represent it in the courts,"
the delegee may sue on behalf of Congress); United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir.
1976) ("It is clear that the House as a whole has standing to assert its investigatory power, and can
designate [by House Rule] a member to act on its behalf.").
68. See supra note 23.
69. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. H6479 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Brooks); id. at
H6482 (statement of Rep. Berman).
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 99: 341
gesting that the False Claims Act's grant of private standing, like
conventional citizens' suit standing, was conceived to vindicate private as
well as public interests.
The mere fact that the same Act can plausibly be interpreted7 0 as secur-
ing either solely public or also private interests"1 bolsters my earlier sug-
gestion that the asserted public/private representation distinction is un-
helpful, 2  and therefore it portends the conclusion that the Act's
constitutionality ought not turn on this slippery characterization. 3 But I
now wish to consider the constitutional challenge to the qui tam concept
on its own terms. Understanding the qui tam litigation framework to au-
thorize private citizens to represent the interests of the United States (as
opposed to their own interests), does the framework comport with separa-
tion of powers values underlying Article II?
II. Qui Tam ACTIONS AND ARTICLE II
Litigants representing the United States are not provided with an exog-
enously defined list of the various interests of their client. Rather, the liti-
gants must define for themselves the United States' interests and then de-
cide how and when best to implement those interests through specific
70. Cf. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2920 n.21 (1989) (holding
open question as to proper characterization of qui tam plaintiff's role in False Claims Act litigation);
United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1903 n.11 (1989) (same).
71. One aspect of the False Claims Act in particular suggests, although not definitively, that the
Act is more fairly characterized as protecting public-oriented rather than private interests as those
terms are used in conventional parlance. The Act provides that once a suit is filed on a specific set of
allegations by any plaintiff, all future suits by others raising the same allegations are barred. 31
U.S.C.A. § 3730(b)(5) (West Supp. 1989). Cf S. REP., supra note 12, at 27 ("[If the Government
declines to intervene in a qui tam action, it is estopped from pursuing the same action administratively
or in a separate judicial action."). In contrast, most traditional citizens' suit schemes that grant private
rights of action theoretically allow each aggrieved citizen to sue the wrongdoer for redress. But see,
e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1982) (citizen must notify EPA and
state sixty days prior to initiating private action, and such action is barred if either government first
brings its own suit).
In certain contexts this distinction may be of limited practical significance. For example, when
citizens' suit schemes authorize private plaintiffs to seek injunctive but not monetary relief, the first
successful suit may not bar by operation of statute subsequent suits on the same set of facts, but
subsequent suits may fail to satisfy Article III requirements because the controversy has become moot.
Moreover, in specific instances, claim or issue preclusion doctrines may bar or hinder the prosecution
of subsequent suits.
Nevertheless, the statutory bar applicable to subsequent False Claims Act suits provides at least
some support for the view that, as a conceptual matter, any given false claims practice ought to be
understood as creating but a single (albeit collectively defined) injury under the Act. Courts have long
interpreted the preclusion of multiple suits to support the characterization that the "true" plaintiff in
False Claims Act litigation "must be the United States, no matter who brings [an actioni on its
behalf." United States v. B.F. Goodrich, 41 F. Supp. 574, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
73. Of course, "Federal statutes are to be so construed as to avoid serious doubt of their constitu-
tionality," Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986) (citation omit-
ted), and interpreting the Act as granting private citizens private rights of action certainly falls far
short of "perverting the purpose of a statute." Id. (citation omitted). Hence, even if one concludes that
this public/private representation distinction is salient and that the Constitution prohibits private citi-
zens from representing the United States in litigation, then the False Claims Act's constitutionality
ought to be sustained through such a saving interpretation.
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enforcement actions. Traditionally, Congress leaves the responsibility for
making these decisions largely to executive branch officials.
Congress' strategy in authorizing qui tam actions is to diffuse this re-
sponsibility among both public and private actors. Congress sets in motion
an enforcement machinery designed to strengthen the protection of the
United States' specific interest in remedying and deterring the misconduct
identified by the qui tam statute (here, false claims practices). Private citi-
zens help refine and implement Congress' general wishes by filing and
litigating specific qui tarn suits. Finally, the executive branch also partici-
pates in defining and implementing the interests of the United States by
filing its own enforcement actions (and, under the present version of the
False Claims Act, by overseeing and perhaps taking over qui tam
litigation).
The novel Article II challenge presently being levied against the qui
tar concept interweaves two related arguments against this diffusion of
responsibility for defining and implementing the United States' law en-
forcement interests. First, Article II assigns this responsibility exclusively
to the President, and even partial delegation of this function to qui tar
plaintiffs violates separation of powers principles by "prevent[ing] the Ex-
ecutive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned func-
tions."7 4 Second, to the extent Congress may divest the President of ple-
nary prosecutorial discretion by empowering an alternative and
independent legal representative for the United States, that representative
must at least be a properly appointed "Officer of the United States"
rather than a self-selected and self-interested private citizen. I consider
each of these arguments in turn.
A. Qui Tam Litigation and Executive Prosecutorial Discretion
Does Article II bestow upon the President the power to exercise discre-
tion in implementing Federal law through litigation, or is the President's
function in the realm of domestic law enforcement simply to follow con-
gressional directives, including those governing the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion?" If the former, does this independent executive
law enforcement function cover only criminal actions or also civil actions
vindicating solely public rights, and why does it not extend further to
cover civil actions vindicating private rights but secondarily (and design-
74. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 660 (1989) (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of
Gen. Serv., 443 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)). The term "separation of powers" is somewhat of a misno-
mer-generally, in the sense that our tripartite governmental scheme is more fairly characterized as
one of overlapping but mutually constraining powers; and particularly in this context, in the sense
that the constitutional threat posed here consists (primarily) of a vertical disintegration of executive/
private boundaries rather than a horizontal disintegration of boundaries separating coordinate
branches. For ease of exposition, however, I employ conventional parlance.
75. Unless stated otherwise, I use the phrase "prosecutorial discretion" to refer to civil as well as
criminal cases.
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edly) benefiting the public? Finally, for those types of enforcement actions
within the posited executive function, what particular attributes of
prosecutorial discretion must be protected from external constraint?
Answers to these questions cannot be found in the constitutional text.
The Supreme Court has suggested occasionally that the "take Care"
clause 6 vests the President with prosecutorial discretion over Federal law
enforcement, but this clause is better viewed as a mandate to follow the
will of Congress than as a grant of exogenously defined power.77 And
even if viewed as the latter, the clause certainly provides no guidance as to
the contours of any such independent executive function. Moreover, while
an executive function of law enforcement may derive from the clause vest-
ing the President with the "executive Power, '7 8 this textual provision pro-
vides no greater guidance. Finally, the President might claim at least a
supervisory role over law enforcement pursuant to Article II's appoint-
ments clause, but this clause fails to specify when litigants representing
the United States must be "Officers of the United States" to whom the
specified appointment procedures apply.7
9
Faced with this paucity of textual guidance, the Supreme Court re-
cently turned to history when asked to characterize the functions of an
independent counsel empowered by Congress to enforce criminal law
against executive branch officials: "[tihere is no real dispute that the func-
tions performed by the independent counsel are 'executive' in the sense
that they are law enforcement functions that typically have been under-
taken by officials within the Executive Branch.""0 To the extent that this
76. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3 (President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed").
See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) ("[Tlhe decision of a prosecutor in the Execu-
tive Branch not to indict. . . has long been regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch,
inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to 'take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.' "); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976) (referring to initiation of lawsuits on
behalf of the United States as part of President's "take Care" function).
77. The term "faithfully" itself suggests that the President acts subservient to another in the exer-
cise of this function. See Sunstein, supra note 24, at 1471 ("The 'take Care' clause, however, is a
duty, not a license. The clause requires the President to carry out the law as enacted by Congress.")
(footnote omitted).
Of course, to the extent that Congress grants discretion by statute to the President, this clause
empowers-indeed commands-her to exercise that discretion. But the clause does not provide her an
independent source of discretion such that she is empowered to ignore any specific statutory directives
governing her behavior.
78. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 provides that the "executive Power shall be vested in a Presi-
dent ...." See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2626-27 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("[g]overnmental investigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive function" as-
signed to President by vesting clause).
79. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 provides that the President "shall nominate, and by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . all other Officers of the United States...
but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in
the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."
80. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2619 (discussing Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 591-599
(West Supp. 1989)). Indeed, Justice Scalia queried rhetorically in his dissent: "In what other sense
can one identify 'the executive Power' that is supposed to be vested in the President (unless it includes
everything the Executive Branch is given to do) except by reference to what has always and every-
where-if conducted by Government at all-been conducted never by the legislature, never by the
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historical inquiry properly influences constitutional interpretation,81 it
leads to the opposite conclusion here; qui tam actions have been author-
ized by Congress and adjudicated by courts for over two hundred years in
this country.82
Beyond text and history, separation of powers doctrine ought to reflect
the structural values served by assigning particular functions to particular
governmental (or private) actors. In broad terms, Congress defines legal
interests and corresponding obligations based upon its view of wise social
policy, and the executive branch implements those obligations in specific
cases. While Congress cannot itself "execute" the laws it has enacted,83 it
may structure the operations of the executive branch as it finds "necessary
and proper" to ensure the executive's ability to execute the laws in a man-
ner faithful to congressional will.84 Limits on Congress' power to do so
derive from the competing values served by executive discretion. Hence,
the appropriate separation of powers inquiry entails identifying the values
purportedly served by executive control over litigation on behalf of the
United States and assessing whether these values justify precluding Con-
courts, and always by the executive." Id. at 2626 (emphasis in original).
81. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1986) (First Congress' actions "provide[]
'contemporaneous and weighty evidence' of the Constitution's meaning since many of the Members of
the First Congress 'had taken part in framing that instrument.' ") (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783, 790 (1983)); cf Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 669 (1989) ("Our 200-year
tradition of extrajudicial service [by Article III judges] is additional evidence that the doctrine of
separated powers does not prohibit judicial participation in certain extrajudicial activity."). For those
adhering to the originalist school of constitutional interpretation, this historical presumption may well
be dispositive. See Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849 (1989) (defending
originalist interpretive method with heavy reliance on Federal, state, and English historical practice).
But see Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 494 (1987) ("The
modern presidency is so different from the entity contemplated by the framers that it is unrealistic
simply to 'apply' their choices to the present situation.").
82. See supra text accompanying notes 2-4. Perhaps for this reason, Justice Scalia-a self-
proclaimed originalist, see Scalia, supra note 81-seems to have carefully preserved the possibility
that private prosecution is consistent with Article II. See Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2626 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (criminal prosecution is executive function "if conducted by Government at all"); Young v.
United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A., 107 S. Ct. 2124, 2142 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(criminal prosecution is executive function "at least to the extent that it is publicly exercised").
83. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (Congress may not enjoy removal power
over officer performing executive functions); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (legislative veto
provision invalid because Congress may not control execution of laws except through Article I proce-
dures); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 139 (1976) (Congress may not "'enforce [the laws] or appoint
the agents charged with the duty of such enforcement' ") (quoting Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277
U.S. 189, 202 (1928)). While Congress may to some extent "commingle the functions of the [three]
branches," Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 660, Congress may not control the precise execution of legislation
through the power of appointment, removal, or veto.
Qui tam authorization does not constitute an impermissible congressional execution of its own laws.
See infra text accompanying notes 168-71.
84. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof.") (emphasis added). See generally Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining
Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect
of the Sweeping Clause, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Spring 1976, at 102 (explaining contours of this
congressional power).
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gress from diffusing the enforcement power through qui tam
authorization."5
In particular, because qui tam statutes authorize the executive branch
to bring its own enforcement actions"6 and because qui tam suits do not
force the executive to take any significant affirmative actions such as initi-
ating or joining litigation,87 we must focus on the values purportedly
served by executive discretion to prevent prosecution by private citizens of
suspected wrongdoers. Only in rare and unique circumstances is it likely
that the executive branch would actually prefer that no private suit be
brought to remedy misconduct; the executive generally welcomes efforts by
private citizens to bring to its attention statutory violations and to offer
their private resources in support of the United States' enforcement
effort.88
85. The propriety of this inquiry may itself be questioned, given the wide range of methodological
approaches to separation of powers doctrine profferred by various scholars. While space and time
constraints preclude a fully developed defense of my methodology, two brief observations are in order.
First, some might argue that focusing on contemporary values accords too little weight to the fram-
ers' original value choices. See, e.g., Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and Subse-
quent De-Evolution of the Separation of Powers, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REv. 719 (contrasting between
pragmatic "evolutionary" and originalist "de-evolutionary" interpretive traditions in separation of
powers jurisprudence). But the originalist tradition strongly favors the constitutionality of the qui tam
concept. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82. Because only a concern for contemporary values
underlying separation of powers jurisprudence may fairly justify skepticism about the qui tam con-
cept's validity, this concern merits attention.
Second, some might argue that my approach undervalues the importance of a relatively rigid sepa-
ration of functions between various governmental branches. See, e.g., Sargentich, The Contemporary
Debate About Legislative-Executive Separation of Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 430, 434-48 (1987)
(contrasting between "formalistic" and "functional" approaches); Strauss, The Place of Agencies in
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 34 COLuM. L. REV. 573 (1984) (con-
trasting between "separation of powers," "separation of functions," and "checks and balances" ap-
proaches). As an initial matter, while the "formalist" and "functionalistic" traditions offer distinct
approaches to evaluating the validity of a particular legislative interference with a function concededly
assigned to the executive branch, their approaches are far less divergent with respect to the prior
question whether a particular function is assigned to the executive branch in the first instance. The
answer to this prior question, it seems to me, necessarily turns on an evaluation of structural values,
at least when (as here) the text is indeterminate.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's most recent separation of powers cases clearly reflect a more func-
tionalist methodology. See Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989); Morrison v. Olson, 108
S. Ct. 2597 (1986). Embracing a values-oriented approach here allows me to provide more helpful
guidance for the courts that are now or soon will be assessing the constitutionality of the qui tam
concept. See Gewirtz, Realism in Separation of Powers Thinking, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 343,
351-54 & n.39 (1989) (observing that Mistretta and Morrison reflect "meticulously context-specific
approach[es]" and suggesting courts addressing separation of powers challenges should focus carefully
on a law's "particular objectives and . . . distinctively complex structure").
86. Recall that the False Claims Act in particular also allows the executive to take over actions
initiated by qui tam plaintiffs. See supra text accompanying notes 52-59.
87. Compare private suits brought to enjoin nondiscretionary agency regulatory or enforcement
action. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975)
(entertaining suit under Administrative Procedure Act to force executive enforcement action).
88. Even when the Department of Justice declines to take over a privately initiated prosecution, it
typically does so based on its belief that the United States will be adequately represented by the qui
tam litigant, and/or its belief that the potential monetary recovery is too small to justify the expendi-
ture of scarce public funds. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100, 1102
n.2 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting submission of DOJ):
1It is because [governmental] interests will be served by the relator's control of this action that
the United States has declined to enter . . . . The relator . . . has developed a special exper-
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But in such rare circumstances, allowing qui tam litigants to initiate
enforcement actions may undermine two values assertedly secured by ex-
ecutive prosecutorial discretion. First, vesting discretion not to prosecute in
the executive branch ensures that the task of weighing competing public
policy objectives in order to devise a law enforcement strategy best serving
the overall interests of the United States falls to a politically accountable
and unitary actor. Second, vesting discretion not to prosecute in the execu-
tive provides a political check against the unwarranted employment of liti-
gation as a tool of oppression, thus advancing due process norms. When
these contentions are carefully dissected and explored, it turns out that the
underlying values either are not worthy of rigid constitutional protection
or are not significantly threatened by qui tam litigation.
1. Coordination of Competing Public Policy Objectives
That a particular illegal act injures the public does not mean that pros-
ecuting the wrongdoer necessarily serves the overall public interest, which
is composed of many competing objectives. Most obviously, public re-
source scarcity typically requires an executive agency charged with enforc-
ing the law to assess not only "whether a violation has occurred, but
whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or another,
whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular
enforcement action . . . best fits the agency's overall policies, and, indeed,
whether the agency has enough resources to undertake the action at all."89
We need not explore here whether these difficult decisions entailed by
limited prosecutorial resources must be made by the accountable and uni-
tary executive branch, for private qui tam litigation does not require such
decisions to be made.90
Nor should we be concerned that qui tam litigation may supersede a
judgment by the executive that particular statutory objectives are too un-
important to pursue. Even assuming that such executive judgments actu-
ally turn on a view of the statute's merits and not on resource con-
tise in the detection and investigation of Frauds of this type . . . .Further, the relator pos-
sesses the ability, manpower and resources with which to pursue this action. Thus, the qui tam
plaintiff herein is the proper party to conduct this action.
The DOJ has suggested in at least one qui tam case that it would not intervene because it found
after its preliminary investigation "insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the acts of the defendants
resulted in damage or injury to the United States." U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release No. 88-
523 (Dec. 16, 1988), referring to United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., No. CV
87-1840 WDK (C.D. Ca. 1987). But even this judgment alone does not suggest disapproval of the qui
tam plaintiff's subsequent effort to surpass the DOJ's expectations through informative discovery.
89. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). See also Easterbrook, On Not Enforcing the
Law, REGULATION 14, 15 (Jan.-Feb. 1983) ("Effective enforcement of the most important rules usu-
ally entails reducing the number of prosecutions of some offenses by a very great deal.").
90. Cf Chemerinsky, Controlling Fraud Against the Government: The Need for Decentralized
Enforcement, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995, 1006 (1983) ("In situations where the Justice Depart-
ment chooses not to exercise its prosecutorial discretion because of a shortage of resources, there [are]
obvious advantage[s] to allowing others to act on behalf of the government.").
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straints,91 such judgments are not constitutionally protected by Article II
against congressional override. Perhaps in specific contexts a policy of ex-
ecutive nonenforcement might inspire fruitful public debate as to the mer-
its of particular statutes and might even encourage legislative reconsidera-
tion.9 2 But the ultimate judgment as to the relative importance of
enforcing various statutes properly rests with Congress, the branch most
directly responsible for such broad policymaking decisions. Congress usu-
ally implements its policy judgments by shaping the environment within
which executive prosecutorial discretion is exercised, either crudely by
compartmentalizing and controlling the budgets for various law enforce-
ment activities, or more carefully by dictating the priorities by which exec-
utive officials must be guided when enforcing discrete statutes.9" But Con-
gress may also ultimately determine relative enforcement levels of statutes
more indirectly by supplementing executive efforts with citizens' suits, and
qui tam suits pose no greater constraint on executive discretion to deter-
mine the relative importance of enforcing specific statutes than does the
more conventional mode of dual enforcement.
Concerns about resource allocation and the wisdom of Congress' gen-
eral objectives aside, are there persuasive reasons to prevent qui tam
plaintiffs from potentially interfering with the executive branch's tradi-
tional ability to determine how best to use available enforcement tools to
bring wrongdoers to justice in specific cases? Many forms of misconduct
are actionable by the executive branch through criminal, civil, and per-
haps even administrative proceedings as well.9 4 Typically, the executive
branch can decide which avenue or combination thereof promises best to
promote the goals of compensation, deterrence, and (when appropriate)
retribution. Moreover, executive officials usually can determine the opti-
mal timing of various enforcement measures. For example, the DOJ
might wish to delay civil prosecution of a particular fraudulent practice
until after it had more time to investigate the facts, or until after it had
brought criminal or administrative proceedings against the wrongdoer
(and maybe even only if such proceedings were unsuccessful), or until
after it had been able to establish judicial precedent in another case with a
91. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 89, at 14-16 (comparing views of Carter and Reagan Ad-
ministrations on desirability of enforcing antitrust and antidiscrimination statutes with respect to spe-
cific categories of offenses).
92. See, e.g., Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 881, 897 (1983) ("Sunday blue laws, for example, were widely
unenforced long before they were widely repealed-and had the first not been possible the second
might never have occurred.").
93. See infra text accompanying notes 98-100; see also Krent, supra note 2, at 284-85 & n.45
(discussing Congress' manipulation of agency budgets to dictate enforcement priorities).
94. Many false claims practices giving rise to civil liability also subject the wrongdoer to criminal
liability under the criminal version of the False Claims Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 287 (West. Supp. 1989),
and some may also be actionable through various administrative proceedings; see, e.g., Civil Monetary
Penalties Law, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7a (West Supp. 1989) (imposing penalties for Medicare fraud).
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more favorable factual background or procedural posture.9" By dictating
the forum and timing of an enforcement action against a particular false
claims practice, initiation of a qui tam suit might lead to a resolution of
that particular case which is less than optimal from the executive's point
of view.
The False Claims Act specifically accommodates many of these case-
specific concerns about optimal case management.96 But even ignoring
such accommodations, is the ability of the executive branch to proceed
against particular wrongdoers as it believes optimal so important that ple-
nary control over case management must be considered an executive pre-
rogative that Congress may not circumscribe? Such a conclusion cannot
easily be defended. When evaluated from a case-by-case perspective, un-
fettered executive discretion over case management decisions may best tai-
lor remedial and punitive objectives with respect to each discrete instance
of wrongdoing. But the central premise underlying qui tam authorization
is that, when viewed from a more global perspective, the set of targeted
misconduct is underenforced in a regime of exclusive executive discre-
tion.97  Whether the United States' overall law enforcement interests
would be furthered or retarded by encouraging a greater number of en-
forcement actions even at the expense of frustrating the optimal manage-
ment of specific prosecutions is a policy determination most appropriately
left to Congress.98 Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that "Congress
may limit an [executive] agency's exercise of enforcement power if it
wishes, either by setting substantive priorities, or by otherwise circum-
scribing an agency's power to discriminate among issues or cases it will
95. The executive branch's discretion over the choice between and timing of various modes of
enforcement is circumscribed to some extent by the contours of the underlying legal schemes (e.g.,
statutes of limitation) and also by factual events (e.g., threatened bankruptcy of putative defendant).
Moreover, such discretion may also be circumscribed by constitutional rules. For example, in United
States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989), the Supreme Court recognized that in rare cases a civil
penalty assessed against the defendant in a civil False Claims Act proceeding may be "so extreme and
so divorced from the Government's damages and expenses as to constitute punishment" for purposes
of applying the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy prohibition against multiple punishments in mul-
tiple proceedings. Id. at 1898. Imposition of a punitive sanction in a criminal proceeding precludes the
government from subsequently seeking an additional civil sanction rising to the level of "punishment"
in a second proceeding. Id. at 1902. Presumably the bar operates equally in the opposite temporal
direction. Hence, should the executive wish to prosecute an alleged false claims practitioner both
civilly and criminally, this double jeopardy rule requires it either to bring the two claims in a single
proceeding, id. at 1903, or else ensure that the civil award does not rise to the level of "punishment."
96. For example, the Act provides for a stay of discovery where it would interfere with the DOJ's
diligent efforts to investigate or prosecute the same wrongdoing in a separate criminal or civil proceed-
ing, 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(c)(4) (West Supp. 1989), and the DOJ may elect to pursue the false claims
allegations through any available alternative administrative proceeding. Id. § 3730(c)(5). And, of
course, the DOJ can shape the order in which legal issues are presented at least within each case by
electing to take over the primary responsibility for conducting the prosecution.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 42-48.
98. Cf, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (It is the "exclusive
province of the Congress not only to formulate legislative policies and mandate programs and projects,
but also to establish their relative priority for the Nation. Once Congress. . .has decided the order of
priorities in a given area, it is for the Executive to administer the laws . . ").
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pursue." 9  Congress usually gives effect to judgments of this type by di-
recting specific executive behavior.1 00 But this same judgment underlies
Congress' decision to enact citizens' suit enforcement schemes. For exam-
ple, while private actions against wrongdoers to compel compliance with
statutory obligations generally do not preclude the executive branch from
subsequently bringing its own enforcement actions,"1 such private suits
certainly affect the timing and circumstances of judicial resolution of spe-
cific legal issues. Such suits may also prompt a wide variety of actions by
defendants (e.g., destruction of evidence or bankruptcy) that ultimately
frustrate the executive's ability to shape its subsequent enforcement efforts
in the optimal fashion. Even more clearly, "private rights of initiation" 0 2
to compel executive enforcement of statutory obligations circumscribe ex-
ecutive discretion over case management decisions in precisely the same
way as do qui tam suits (in addition to requiring the affirmative invest-
ment of agency resources).'0 3
99. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 (1985) (holding that Congress could have, but did not,
prescribe such enforcement priorities for Food and Drug Administration, and therefore agency's non-
enforcement decisions were not judicially reviewable).
100. See, e.g., id. at 832-33 (presumption of nonreviewability under Administrative Procedure
Act of agency nonprosecutorial discretion "may be rebutted where the substantive statute has provided
guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers"); Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421
U.S. 560, 563 n.2 (1975) (upholding judicial review for Secretary of Labor's failure to bring enforce-
ment action where substantive statute provided that "Secretary shall investigate such [administrative]
complaint and, if hefinds probable cause to believe that a violation. . . has occurred. . . he shall
. ..bring a civil action .. ") (emphasis added).
There is no principled basis for suggesting as a general rule that Congress may establish enforce-
ment priorities for all executive agencies in charge of law enforcement except the Department of
Justice. Cf Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("[TIhe exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, like the exercise of Executive discretion generally, is subject to statutory...
limits enforceable through judicial review.").
101. The bar on subsequent suits under the False Claims Act (even by the DOJ) on a given set of
facts, see supra note 71, creates the theoretical possibility of collusive suits. For example, an employee
might sue her company but intentionally fail to develop her case adequately or agree to settle for a
pittance, simply to shield her company from a more vigorous prosecution by the DOJ. As an empiri-
cal matter, this scenario is unrealistic, because the intentional disclosure of fraud would subject the
defendant to alternative governmental sanctions, ranging from criminal prosecution to administrative
sanction to contract cancellation. And, as a normative matter, such a collusive suit would hurt the
United States only if the DOJ already knew or was about to learn of the fraud and would have
chosen to prosecute; otherwise, the United States is no worse off than it would have been absent the
suit. Finally, even if the threat of collusive suits were both real and damaging, the False Claims Act
specifically averts this threat by requiring DOJ consent to settlement or dismissal and by allowing the
DOJ to assume responsibility for the prosecution. See supra text accompanying notes 52-59.
Presumably a successful qui tam action recovering penalties sufficiently extreme so as to constitute
"punishment" for double jeopardy purposes, see supra note 95, would bar the DOJ from subse-
quently initiating a criminal proceeding with respect to the same false claims practice. But the execu-
tive can circumvent such a potential bar either by seeking a stay of the civil qui tam action before it
proceeds to judgment and then bringing and resolving the criminal charges first, or by intervening in
the qui tam suit and then joining criminal charges in the same proceeding. The executive loses some
control over the timing of, but not its ability to initiate, a criminal action. But, as explained here,
unfettered executive control over such timing is not so critical as to warrant invalidating qui tam
actions on this ground alone.
102. See supra note 7.
103. See supra text accompanying note 89. Moreover, even when the executive intervenes as of
right in a traditional "private right of action," see, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2) (1982), the executive's ability to represent as it chooses the United States' inter-
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The posited private/public distinction between the interests underlying
citizens' suits and qui tam suits does not affect the extent to which dual
enforcement circumscribes executive case management discretion. Nor is
executive participation in policy implementation through the exercise of
that discretion intrinsically more important in suits vindicating public
rights rather than private rights designed to serve the public interest."0 4
Hence, given that congressional authorization of private citizens' suits is
constitutionally acceptable, the value of executive policymaking thought to
underlie executive prosecutorial discretion does not persuasively justify in-
validation of the qui tam concept.
105
Indeed, in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 08 the Supreme Court
appeared to endorse Congress' authority to circumscribe the executive's
discretion to promote its own view of case-specific interests in enforcing
the False Claims Act. At a time when the Act provided for no executive
intervention into qui tam actions, the executive asked the Court to inter-
pret the Act's grant of jurisdiction over qui tam suits to exclude "para-
sitic" suits brought by informers possessing no independent knowledge of
the alleged fraud.'07 The executive asserted
that effective law enforcement requires that control of litigation be
left to the Attorney General; that divided control [over False Claims
Act enforcement] is against the public interest; that the Attorney
General might believe that war interests would be injured by filing
suits such as this; . . . and finally that conditions have changed since
the Act was passed in 1863.108
But the Court dismissed these arguments, explaining that they were "ad-
dressed to the wrong forum. . . .The very fact that Congress passed this
statute shows that it concluded that other considerations of policy out-
ests is potentially circumscribed by the private plaintiff's authority to take differing positions on vari-
ous legal and strategic questions arising in the litigation.
104. One might object at this point that the nature of the underlying interest is relevant simply
because the executive is responsible for overseeing litigation on behalf of "its" client, the United
States, in a way it is not responsible for overseeing litigation on behalf of private parties. But this
objection begs the very question at issue here: What structural values are promoted by executive
discretion over enforcement of public (but not private) legal interests such that this function ought to
be viewed as being exclusively within the executive's domain and requiring plenary prosecutorial
discretion?
105. Perhaps Congress cannot itself fine-tune the optimal balancing of competing general and
case-specific interests for every discrete proposed prosecution, either because of practical constraints on
its ability to do so imposed by Article I lawmaking procedures, cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983) (Congress cannot fine-tune legislation through one-house veto), or because at some point such
fine-tuning approaches an impermissible congressional aggrandizement of power. See discussion supra
at note 83. But the important point here is that no weighty Article II values appear to prohibit
Congress from strongly influencing the ultimate balance of competing general and case-specific inter-
ests by authorizing private citizens to supplement executive law enforcement efforts. Cf. infra text
accompanying note 171 (qui tam authorization does not impermissibly aggrandize Congress' power).
106. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
107. See supra note 12.
108. 317 U.S. at 547.
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weighed those now emphasized by the [executive]." 1 °9 Given the Court's
insistence on interpreting ambiguous statutes to avoid constitutional con-
cerns," ° it seems fair to read the Court's rejoinder as suggesting that the
executive's concern for unitary control over case selection and manage-
ment, while voiced in terms of statutory construction, also lacked constitu-
tional dimension.
This conclusion dovetails with the Court's recent rejection of an Article
II challenge to the Ethics in Government Act,"' which vests substantial
prosecutorial discretion over the initiation and conduct of criminal pro-
ceedings against high-ranking executive officers in a court-appointed inde-
pendent counsel." 2 The Court understood the Ethics Act to "reduce[] the
amount of control or supervision that the Attorney General and, through
him, the President exercises over the investigation and prosecution of a
certain class of alleged criminal activity."" Nevertheless, the Court held
that certain provisions of the Act reserved for the "executive branch suffi-
cient control over the independent counsel to ensure that the President is
able to perform his constitutionally assigned duties."'" 4 First, only the At-
torney General can request appointment of an independent counsel and
his decision not to do so is unreviewable; the Act therefore retains for the
Attorney General a "degree of control over the power to initiate an inves-
tigation by the independent counsel.""' Second, the Attorney General
may remove an independent counsel for "good cause.""'  Finally, once
appointed, an independent counsel's jurisdiction is defined with reference
to facts submitted by the Attorney General, and the counsel must "abide
by Justice Department policy unless it is not 'possible' to do so."" '
The Court's conclusion that these features secured the executive consti-
tutionally "sufficient" control over criminal law enforcement validates
Congress' authority to determine that the United States' general interest
in zealous enforcement of particular statutes supersedes any potentially
competing case management interests governing specific prosecutions. The
Ethics Act requires the Attorney General to seek appointment of an inde-
pendent counsel unless his initial 90-day-maximum investigation-which
can itself be triggered by congressional request-reveals "no reasonable
109. Id.
110. See supra note 73.
111. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 591-599 (West Supp. 1989).
112. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
113. Id. at 2621.
114. Id. at 2622.
115. Id. at 2621.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2621-22. It is noteworthy that the Court did not even perceive a sufficient interference
with the executive's ability to accomplish its assigned duties to reach the "balancing" stage of the
Court's doctrinal inquiry, according to which even an adverse impact on those duties could be "'justi-
fied by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress.'"
Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 660 n.13 (1989) (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of Gen.
Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)).
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grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted."' ," The Attor-
ney General's sole control over if and when a particular prosecution is
brought consists of his power to determine whether further investigation
or litigation appears patently frivolous.' And even if the Attorney Gen-
eral may remove an independent counsel for making what the executive
considers to be poor case management decisions, 120 the result is the ap-
pointment of a new counsel and continuation of the investigation or prose-
cution. Hence, not only did Morrison validate Congress' power to restruc-
ture law enforcement so as to allow the national interest in criminally
prosecuting high-ranking executive officers to override competing execu-
tive concerns over optimal case management, but it upheld a congressional
method-substantially directing the behavior of the Attorney Gen-
eral-that is far more confrontational than the qui tam concept.
To this point, I have considered and rejected the contention that the
United States' various law enforcement-related interests in optimally man-
aging discrete prosecutions (as interpreted by the executive branch) takes
priority by virtue of Article II over the interests of the United States in
zealous enforcement of particular statutes (as defined by Congress). But
the United States may have interests unrelated to optimal law enforce-
ment in not prosecuting specific cases, interests which perhaps deserve to
be protected by vesting plenary prosecutorial discretion in the executive
branch. Specifically, in rare situations, prosecution of misconduct may in-
terfere with important national security or foreign policy interests. 2 ' By
enacting the False Claims Act in 1863 and revitalizing it in 1986, Con-
gress made the macro-level policy determination that, on balance, rampant
fraud against the government (particularly in military contracting) poses
threats to the nation's security and foreign policy interests more grave
than those potentially raised by particular qui tam suits challenging such
fraud.'22 Yet Congress cannot foresee the sensitive issues that might be
118. 28 U.S.C.A. § 592(b)(1).
119. See Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("the condition that renders such a
request mandatory . . . is so insubstantial that the Attorney General's discretion is severely
confined").
120. The Court did not define "good cause" precisely. It noted only that it certainly includes
counsel "misconduct," whatever that means. 108 S. Ct. at 2619-20. But see Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at
675 ("good cause" removal restrictions "are specifically crafted to prevent the President from exercis-
ing 'coercive influence' over independent agencies"); Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presiden-
tial Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 608-09 (1989) ("it is conven-
tionally understood that it would not be cause for removal that . . . an administrator [removable only
'for cause'] declined to follow the President's policy preferences in favor of policy initiatives that the
administrator prefers and which are also within the administrator's lawful discretion").
121. These include, for example, actions alleging military contractor fraud in secret programs,
particularly when the allegations do not involve simple overbilling practices but rather false certifica-
tions of safety or performance standards, substitution of cheaper but substandard parts, or the
equivalent.
122. See supra note 36 and accompanying text; see also United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317
U.S. 537, 547 (1943) ("one of the chief purposes of the Act, which was itself first passed in war time,
was to stimulate action to protect the government against war frauds"). Moreover, qui tam authoriza-
tion, by greatly enhancing the likelihood of discovery and prosecution of frauds, is intended to deter
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raised in individual cases; and even one skeptical of executive motives
might sleep better knowing that the decision whether the pecuniary and
national security benefits of a particular false claims prosecution outweigh
its potential damage to national security or foreign policy objectives lay
with the executive branch rather than with a private litigant seeking fi-
nancial gain.
This real concern might justify some executive oversight of particular
privately initiated lawsuits; nonetheless, it does not persuasively argue for
invalidation of the entire qui tam concept. Morrison v. Olson implicitly
holds that Congress may structure law enforcement so as to encourage
prosecutions despite potential competing national security and foreign pol-
icy concerns. Prosecutions against high-ranking executive officials practi-
cally invite conflicts between law enforcement and these other priorities.
Indeed, Morrison itself arose out of a bitter dispute over the President's
assertion of an "executive privilege" to withhold certain documents from
Congress,' 23 and Justice Scalia's dissent specifically warned of potential
conflicts between prosecution and both foreign policy 2 " and national se-
curity concerns. 125 Yet the Court upheld the statute despite its apparent
directive that the Attorney General refrain from considering factors unre-
lated to an investigation's likely merits when deciding whether to request
appointment of an independent counsel." 6
I acknowledge that a court-appointed independent counsel would be
likely to take these competing concerns more seriously than would many
private litigants seeking pecuniary gain. But the Court suggested in Hess
that this structural tendency towards vigorous private enforcement does
not invalidate the qui tam enforcement scheme. Rather, the Court in-
structed the Attorney General to take his plea that "war interests would
be injured by filing suits such as this" to Congress, whose province appar-
ently included balancing these competing concerns.'
27
Indeed, the same tradeoffs are entailed by a host of private actions rou-
tinely prosecuted by citizens to vindicate their own personal rights, as
these actions may also address matters affecting foreign policy interests or
national security. 128 I know of no serious claim that statutory schemes
authorizing citizen enforcement of private rights of action impermissibly
fraudulent conduct in the first place. This deterrence should reduce the need for litigation involving
sensitive matters.
123. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2605-07.
124. Id. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Such concerns were certainly prophetic in light of those
subsequently raised by an independent counsel's prosecution of Oliver North.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 118-20.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 108-09.
128. Examples include shareholders' actions challenging corporate acceptance of foreign bribes
and payoffs or challenging corporate frauds against the government; securities actions challenging
domestic takeovers by international conglomerates; and environmental litigation challenging the loca-
tion and transportation of military arms, nuclear technologies, and radioactive wastes.
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intrude on the executive's law enforcement function simply by creating the
potential for specific suits to raise such problems. Instead, our concerns
are mollified by the executive's ability to exert some control over individ-
ual cases in which conflicts actually arise by invoking the "state secrets"
privilege, 2 ' which protects against unsanctioned disclosure of classified
information and in extreme cases may even justify dismissal of the ac-
tion.1 30 Qui tam suits pose no greater threat to national security or foreign
policy objectives than do such private suits, and hence equivalent provi-
sions for executive influence ought to satisfy separation of powers
concerns.1
3 1
In sum, qui tam authorization curbs certain aspects of the executive
branch's traditional prosecutorial discretion and thereby affects to some
extent the executive's ability to define the overall policy interests of the
United States and to decide how those interests can best be secured
through particular lawsuits. But one is hard-pressed to identify persuasive
reasons why Congress may not diffuse the responsibility for making such
policy judgments among itself and private citizens as well as the executive,
through qui tam as well as traditional citizens' suit schemes.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (military and state secrets not subject
to discovery in civil suit against United States); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 105 (1875)
(same). See generally Note, The Military and State Secrets Privilege: Protection for the National
Security or Immunity for the Executive?, 91 YALE L.J. 570 (1982).
130. When the United States successfully invokes its state secrets privilege to prohibit discovery
and/or disclosure of information relevant to a civil suit, whether or not the United States is a party,
usually the private plaintiff is entitled to proceed with the suit (if she can) though she is denied access
to and/or use of the privileged information. See, e.g., Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 64 (D.C. Cir.
1983). But in the extreme circumstance where "the very subject of th[e] litigation is itself a state
secret" and there is "simply no way [a] . . . particular case could be tried without compromising
sensitive military secrets," Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, 776 F.2d 1236, 1243 (4th Cir. 1985), the
court should dismiss the underlying action. See, e.g., id. (dismissing action between private parties
after United States Navy intervened to assert privilege over information central to plaintiff's defama-
tion claim); Farnsworth Cannon v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 281 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (same); cf.
Totten, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) at 107 ("as a general principle, . . . public policy forbids the maintenance of
any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters
which the law itself regards as confidential"). But see Fitzgerald, 776 F.2d at 1242 (dismissal of
action based on invocation of state secrets privilege "is a drastic remedy that has rarely been
invoked").
131. Recall that the False Claims Act permits the executive to take over primary responsibility for
conducting privately initiated litigation and thus to proceed in a manner most consistent with national
security and foreign policy interests. The Act also authorizes the executive to seek dismissal of qui tam
suits. See supra text accompanying notes 52-59. While the Act provides no substantive standard for
dismissal, the hearing requirement was designed to prevent the DOJ from "drop[ping] the false
claims case without legitimate reason." S. REP., supra note 12, at 26; see also id. (court should reject
proposed dismissal if it finds that "dismissal is unreasonable in light of existing evidence, that the
Government has not fully investigated the allegations, or that the Government's decision was based on
arbitrary and improper considerations"). If the DOJ can show that continued prosecution would pose
a substantial threat to important national interests and that no alternative to dismissal would protect
those interests adequately, then dismissal would appear to be consistent with the Act (especially if
such an interpretation is thought necessary to avoid constitutional concerns, see supra note 73).
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2. Protection Against Oppressive Law Enforcement
Vesting prosecutorial discretion in the accountable and unitary execu-
tive branch purports to constrain the potential for oppressive enforcement
of the laws: "The purpose of the separation and equilibration of powers
in general, and of the unitary Executive in particular, was not merely to
assure effective government but to preserve individual freedom."' 32 Op-
pressive law enforcement may include frivolous prosecutions, which force
innocent citizens to suffer the significant financial and social consequences
of engaging in a defensive legal battle, as well as the prosecution of indi-
viduals who, while deserving of punishment, have already been subjected
to alternative sanctions that sufficiently exacted retribution and en-
couraged deterrence.' 33
While the due process clause affords some minimal protection against
prosecutorial overzealousness,"" "[u]nder our system of government, the
primary check against prosecutorial abuse is a political one.""' Vesting
prosecutorial discretion in the executive branch creates both external and
internal checks. Political accountability provides an external check; be-
cause prosecutors within the executive branch are accountable to the Pres-
ident and, through her, ultimately to the people, they are presumably less
likely to enforce the law oppressively or overzealously. In addition, the
unitary nature of the branch fosters various internal checks: Resource
scarcity discourages the initiation of frivolous proceedings; requirements of
personal disinterest discourage the malevolent or self-interested use of
power; and the repetitive nature of discretionary decisions builds experi-
ence, both for each prosecutor and within her community, that may rein-
force norms of dedication to effective and efficient law enforcement.
Individual qui tam plaintiffs are not subject to the same external and
internal constraints. But are these constraints mandated by separation of
powers values? In recent cases, the Supreme Court has held that, even in
the realm of criminal law enforcement, the structural protections against
prosecutorial overzealousness typically afforded by executive discretion
may be significantly relaxed.
As discussed previously, the Court held in Morrison that several fea-
tures of the independent counsel statute give the executive "sufficient con-
132. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2592, 2637 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. Such sanctions may be non-legal, e.g., social opprobrium. In the False Claims Act context,
alternative sanctions may include administrative proceedings to recoup funds wrongfully paid, cancel-
lation of present or future contracts, and debarment from participation in Federal programs.
134. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (public prosecutor "may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor [but] [ilt is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one"); cf
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (equal protection clause precludes decision to
prosecute "deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary
classification") (citation omitted).
135. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2638 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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trol" over law enforcement to satisfy separation of powers concerns,"'
notwithstanding Justice Scalia's impassioned plea for greater protections
for criminal defendants.13 Since the Attorney General must seek appoint-
ment of an independent counsel unless (concededly in her unreviewable
discretion) she finds after a limited inquiry "no reasonable grounds to
believe that further investigation is warranted," '138 the Act provides at best
for only limited executive power to preclude frivolous actions or arguably
cumulative punishment. 3 9
The Court upheld an even greater deviation from the norm of exclusive
executive discretion one term earlier in Young v. United States ex rel.
Vuitton Et Fils S.A.. 14 There the Court upheld a district court's power to
appoint a private attorney to prosecute a criminal contempt action arising
out of a civil case then before the court. Acknowledging that the "execu-
tion of the criminal law" generally is a function "in which only the execu-
tive branch may engage,"1" 1 the Court held that "the initiation of con-
tempt proceedings to punish disobedience to court orders is a part of the
judicial function, 142 and hence appointment of private attorneys for this
purpose is within courts' inherent power.1 4 The Court did counsel that
"a [district] court ordinarily should first request the appropriate [execu-
tive] prosecuting authority to prosecute contempt actions, and should ap-
point a private prosecutor only if that request is denied."'1 44 This practice
allows the executive to initiate prosecutions but, as under the Ethics Act
upheld in Morrison, the executive has little power to prevent such
prosecutions.'45
136. See supra text accompanying notes 114-17.
137. Justice Scalia protested that the statute's elimination of direct presidential control over the
"vast power and the immense discretion that are placed in the hands of a prosecutor," 108 S. Ct. at
2637-38, frustrates the structural check against oppressive enforcement both by insulating the exercise
of discretion from political accountability, id. at 2638, and by avoiding the "unifying influence of the
Justice Department" over enforcement decisions. Id. at 2640.
138. Id. at 2621.
139. The Act's provision for removal of an independent counsel by the Attorney General for
"good cause" provides little practical power to avert an overzealous prosecution. Even if a disagree-
ment over the fairness of a particular prosecution constitutes "good cause," the specter of a President
firing an independent counsel on this basis defies post-Watergate political reality. See also supra text
accompanying note 120 (removal leads not to termination of investigation but to appointment of re-
placement counsel).
140. 107 S. Ct. 2124 (1987).
141. Id. at 2133.
142. Id. at 2131. The Court explained that criminal contempt proceedings "are not intended to
punish conduct proscribed as harmful by the general criminal laws. Rather, they are designed to serve
the limited purpose of vindicating the authority of the court." Id. at 2133. The ability of courts to
initiate such proceedings was "regarded as essential in ensuring that the Judiciary has a means to
vindicate its own authority without complete dependence on other branches." Id. at 2131.
143. In this case, Justice Scalia foreshadowed his lone dissent in Morrison, writing an (also lone)
opinion arguing that, "at least to the extent that it is publicly exercised," criminal law enforcement is
the exclusive province of the executive. Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2142 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
144. 107 S. Ct. at 2134.
145. At best, a DOJ attorney could accept the court's initial request to prosecute and then decline
to file charges, informing the court of the basis for her decision. But the court is free to appoint a new
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The Court in Young did, however, reverse the district court's decision to
appoint as contempt prosecutors private attorneys already representing a
party to the underlying civil case. The Court reasoned that the attorneys'
duty to represent the interests of the United States in the criminal pro-
ceeding" 6 and their duty to represent their private client in the underly-
ing civil case created a potential conflict of interest. Because a "'scheme
injecting a personal interest, financial or otherwise, into the enforcement
process may bring irrelevant or impermissible factors into the
prosecutorial decision,' "147 the Court imposed a "requirement of a disin-
terested prosecutor.'
148
Both Morrison and Young undermine the broad claim that Article II
requires that criminal prosecutors be subject to all of the external and
internal checks traditionally created when prosecutorial discretion is
vested exclusively in the accountable and unitary executive branch. On the
other hand, both cases suggest the need for some lesser level of structural
protection against oppressive enforcement: in Morrison, a minimal degree
of executive participation in the decision to appoint an independent coun-
sel; and in Young, disinterest on the part of the private prosecutor.
Neither structural protection cushions potential defendants against qui
tam litigation that is either frivolous or cumulative, because qui tam
plaintiffs are neither politically accountable for nor personally disinter-
ested in their enforcement decisions.
Morrison and Young, however, address fairness concerns raised by
criminal prosecutions conducted essentially with the backing of the gov-
ernment's full prosecutorial machinery. In contrast, qui tam lawsuits seek
only civil remedies and bring only private enforcement machinery to bear.
In this context, there are powerful reasons to provide putative defendants
prosecutor should the court find the attorney's explanation unconvincing.
146. See 107 S. Ct. at 2136 ("Private attorneys appointed to prosecute a criminal contempt action
represent the United States . . . .The prosecutor is appointed solely to pursue the public interest in
vindication of the court's authority.").
147. Id. at 2138 (quoting Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249-50 (1980)).
148. Id. The reason for the Court's concern with the potential for conflicting loyalties is not
obvious. The appointment practice was challenged as a violation of due process and, while the Court
invoked its supervisory powers over the Federal courts as authority for its decision, see id. at 2138
n.21, Justice Blackmun wrote separately to suggest that due process required the same result. Id. at
2141. This approach signals a concern that appointment of an interested prosecutor creates an intoler-
able risk of unfairness to the criminal defendant. See id. at 2138 & n.19 (noting due process concern);
see also id. at 2138-41 (applying traditional due process standards to determine need for reversal of
conviction as remedy).
The Court also observed that interested prosecutors might be tempted to be either too zealous or
insufficiently zealous in their representation of the United States' interests:
A prosecutor may be tempted to bring a tenuously supported prosecution if such a course
promises financial or legal rewards for the private client. Conversely, a prosecutor may be
tempted to abandon a meritorious prosecution if a settlement providing benefits to the private
client is conditioned on a recommendation against criminal charges.
Id. at 2136. This characterization suggests that the Court may have been concerned, not just with the
potential for unfair treatment of defendants, but also with the lack of a structural guarantee that the
United States' interests would be represented at all. I consider the relevance of this reading of Young
for the qui tam concept infra at text accompanying notes 132-89.
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with much weaker structural protections against frivolous or cumulative
litigation.
First, as reflected in our application of far more stringent procedural
safeguards in criminal than in civil proceedings, our legal system gener-
ally considers criminal behavior to be more opprobrious than civil miscon-
duct and criminal sanctions to be both quantitatively and qualitatively
more severe than civil sanctions.149 The structural check against oppres-
sive prosecution in the form of frivolous suits or excessive punishments
that is created by executive oversight and discretion ought to be much
more stringent in the criminal than the civil context,15 0 just as due process
safeguards are more stringent against erroneous conviction than erroneous
civil liability.' 5 1 The fact that Article II's only explicit structural protec-
tion against prosecutorial oppression-the President's exclusive power to
grant pardons 52-applies to criminal and not civil cases' 53 reinforces the
propriety of erecting greater political as well as procedural checks against
abuse in the criminal context.1
54
149. While the distinctions often are somewhat fuzzy, criminal and civil sanctions are generally
distinguishable both by their nature (imprisonment vs. monetary exactions) and by their purposes
(besides deterrence, punishment vs. compensation). These differences both reflect and generate differ-
ent levels of stigma and opprobrium. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW 12-16
(2d ed. 1986) (evaluating distinctions between criminal and civil sanctions); Hart, The Aims of the
Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 401, 402-06 (1958) (same).
150. Cf Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2139 ("It is a fundamental premise of our society that the state
wield its formidable criminal enforcement powers in a rigorously disinterested fashion, for liberty
itself may be at stake in such matters.").
151. Defendants in qui tam suits under the False Claims Act may claim to deserve greater protec-
tion against frivolous prosecutions and the threat of excessive punishment than that accorded defend-
ants in other civil proceedings simply because their financial exposure may be significantly greater
than mere compensation. In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that "in a particular case a civil
penalty authorized by the Act may be so extreme and so divorced from the Government's damages and
expenses as to constitute punishment" as opposed to compensation. United States v. Halper, 109 S.
Ct. 1892, 1898 (1989). However, the Court recently made clear that "proceedings and penalties under
the civil False Claims Act are indeed civil in nature" for the purposes of defining general procedural
safeguards. Id.; cf Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (punishment of citizenship
forfeiture, despite "civil" label, is in fact sufficiently criminal in nature as to require established
procedural safeguards provided in criminal proceedings).
To be sure, if the Court's holding in Halper that a successful criminal prosecution precludes a
subsequent civil judgment under the False Claims Act in an amount so large as to constitute "punish-
ment" is applied to subsequent qui tam suits, see infra note 157 (discussing such applicability), then
the need to devise structural protections against overzealousness in the form of overpenalization is
largely mooted. But in any case, since the False Claims Act does not trigger the heightened proce-
dural protections afforded criminal defendants notwithstanding the potential for large monetary sanc-
tions, no persuasive reason suggests that the Act-any more than various private rights of action
seeking treble damages for the plaintiffs, see, e.g., Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982), or
monetary penalties for the Federal treasury, see infra note 184 and accompanying text-ought to
trigger the heightened structural protections afforded criminal defendants by executive prosecutorial
discretion.
152. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (President "shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons
for Offences Against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment").
153. See Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925) ("Executive clemency exists to afford relief
from undue harshness or evident mistake in the operation or enforcement of the criminal law.").
154. Interestingly, one might argue, as suggested to me by Professor Akhil Amar, that the Presi-
dent's pardon power is sufficient by itself to secure the prosecutorial discretion purportedly vested in
her by Article II. The reach of the pardon power is coextensive with the range of criminal prosecu-
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Independent of this criminal/civil distinction, the need for structural
protections against oppressive law enforcement is greater when prosecu-
tions are controlled by public rather than private prosecutors. Because of
the wide range of illegal conduct within the scope of their charge to en-
force the law, overzealous public prosecutors have the power to "target" a
particular defendant for prosecution and then spend whatever investiga-
tory resources are necessary to "find" a prosecutable offense. 155 Qui tam
plaintiffs authorized to bring suit only for a particular statutory violation
lack the equivalent opportunity to target defendants rather than specific
illegal practices. In addition, public prosecutors have at their command
"'a terrible array of coercive methods to obtain information'" which,
when misused, "'would unfairly harass citizens, give unfair advantage to
[the prosecutor's personal interests], and impair public willingness to ac-
cept the legitimate use of those powers.' "15 Defending against frivolous
lawsuits brought by the executive thus entails much more serious intru-
sions and harassment than defending against frivolous lawsuits brought by
private citizens with only the traditional tools of civil discovery at their
command. Even when only civil sanctions are at stake, therefore, publicly
initiated prosecutions uniquely threaten to trigger various abuses of law
enforcement power."'
tions that the executive may initiate: The President cannot grant pardons in cases of impeachment, see
supra note 152, but neither does she exercise prosecutorial discretion in such cases. See U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments."). The President can
use the pardon power, though perhaps only at high political cost, as a means of securing unfettered
prosecutorial discretion over criminal cases by pardoning suspected wrongdoers, even prior to indict-
ment. See Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866). Hence even if Article II requires that the
President exercise "sufficient control" over criminal law enforcement to ensure structural values of
executive discretion, see Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2622 (1988), the scope of the President's
pardon power suggests that the specific avenues of control identified in Morrison are redundant and
the Court's inquiry is misguided. Defending Morrison's approach would entail proposing that the
President must have means of exercising prosecutorial discretion that are less visible and thus less
politically risky than granting pardons. In essence, the argument would be that criminal defendants
deserve the protection from prosecutorial overreaching promised by vesting political responsibility for
overseeing prosecutorial discretion in a President who is publicly accountable, but not too much so.
155. See Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2638 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Robert
Jackson, Attorney General of the United States, later Associate Justice of the Supreme Court):
With the law books filled with a great assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair chance
of finding at least a technical violation of some act on the part of almost anyone. In such a
case, it is not a question of discovering the commission of a crime and then looking for the man
who has committed it [but] of picking the man and then searching the law books, or putting
investigators to work, to pin some offense on him. It is in this realm ... that the greatest
danger of abuse of prosecuting power lies.
156. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A., 107 S. Ct. 2134, 2139-40 (1987) (coer-
cive methods include "'police investigation and interrogation, warrants, informers and agents whose
activities are immunized, authorized wiretapping, civil investigatory demands, land] enhanced sub-
poena power' ") (quoting C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcS 460 (1986)). For public prosecu-
tors, the costs of such enforcement tools-as with all other costs associated with prosecution-are
subsidized on a non-contingent basis. While budgetary ceilings constrain enforcement efforts in the
aggregate, see supra text accompanying notes 44-46, they generally do not preclude prosecutorial
overreaching in specific cases.
157. Id. at 2141 (because "[tihat [prosecuting] state official has the power to employ the full
machinery of the state in scrutinizing any given individual, . . . we must have assurance that those
who would wield this power will be guided solely by their sense of public responsibility for the
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Finally, qui tam plaintiffs are subject to unique economic constraints
against frivolous litigation. While they stand to gain by successful prose-
cutions, they also stand to lose by bringing baseless ones (unlike public
prosecutors, independent counsel, and even court-appointed criminal con-
tempt prosecutors 158), both because civil litigation is extremely costly and
because frivolous suits may be sanctioned by adverse attorneys' fees
awards.1"' Even attorneys with favorable contingency fee arrangements
would not often risk initiating prosecutions when their initial evaluations
of the informer's allegations provide "no reasonable grounds to believe
that further investigation is warranted." 8
At bottom, civil qui tam actions pose no greater risk of oppressive law
attainment of justice").
The Supreme Court invoked precisely this distinction between litigation conducted by public au-
thorities and that conducted by private citizens, irrespective of the conceptual nature of the interest
underlying the sanction sought, in holding that the Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause does
not limit the size of punitive damages awards in privately prosecuted civil actions. Browning-Ferris
Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989). The Court acknowledged that punitive damages
"advance the interests of punishment and deterrence," which are traditionally understood to be "gov-
ernmental interests." Id. at 2920. But the excessive fines clause is designed to serve the structural
value of "limiting the ability of the sovereign to use its prosecutorial power, including the power to
collect fines, for improper ends." Id. at 2916; see also id. at 2915 (clause concerned primarily with
"potential for governmental abuse of its 'prosecutorial' power"). Hence the clause protects defendants
from "only those fines directly imposed by, and payable to, the government." Id. at 2916; see also
United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989) (multiple punishment strand of double jeopardy
doctrine is "not triggered by litigation between private parties," id. at 1903, because the clause is
designed to "protect[] against the possibility that the Government is seeking the second punishment
because it is dissatisfied with the sanction obtained in the first proceeding." Id. at 1903 n.10.).
Both Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2920 n.21, and Halper, 109 S. Ct. at 1903 n.11, expressly
declined to declare whether the respective constitutional rules they established apply to qui tam suits.
But their reasoning makes clear that the applicability of various constitutional rules designed to pro-
tect defendants from prosecutorial overreaching may turn on the public nature of the prosecuting
authority rather than on the nature of the sovereign's interest in the litigation-precisely my conten-
tion with respect to fairness concerns purportedly justifying exclusive executive prosecutorial
discretion.
Analogously, the same distinction between the United States as a juridical entity and the govern-
ment as an institutional entity applies to particular procedural rules governing adjudication of qui tam
actions as well. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Petrofsky v. Van Cott, Bigley, Cornwell & McCarthy,
588 F.2d 1327, 1329 (10th Cir. 1978) (where United States declines to intervene in qui tam action, it
is not "party" for purposes of applying special lengthened deadline for filing appeals contained in
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a), because DOJ does not itself decide whether to appeal), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
839 (1979); Public Interest Bounty Hunters v. Board of Governors, 548 F. Supp. 157, 161 (N.D. Ga.
1982) (where United States declines to intervene in qui tam action, it is not "party" for purposes of
assessing attorneys' fees as sanction for frivolous action, because DQJ did not make decision to sue).
158. See Young, 107 S. Ct. at 2137 n.17 (prosecutors paid by government).
159. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d)(4) (West Supp. 1989) (court may award defendant fees and
expenses if defendant prevails and action "was clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primar-
ily for purposes of harassment").
160. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2621 (1988) (citing Ethics Act, 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(1)
(West Supp. 1989)). See Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Law-
yer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REv. 215, 226 (1983) (private attorneys unlikely
to pursue costly litigation absent substantial likelihood of victory).
Moreover, we must keep in mind that, even though the Department of Justice may declare after its
initial limited evaluation of a False Claims Act qui tam suit that the suit appears to lack merit, see
supra note 88, this declaration does not make it so. See United States ex rel. Coates v. St. Louis Clay
Prods. Co., 68 F. Supp. 902, 904-05 (E.D. Mo. 1946) (DOJ may conclude that qui tam suit under
Act lacks merit, but "[tihis Court may draw a different conclusion from the same facts and a jury may
do likewise").
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enforcement than do the vast array of privately prosecuted civil enforce-
ment actions routinely initiated by self-interested plaintiffs to vindicate
their own rights. Like such "private attorneys general," qui tam plaintiffs
are not politically accountable to the public and generally are isolated
from the tempering influence of experience with similar cases. But both
types of private plaintiffs lack the awesome power to visit criminal sanc-
tions upon selected defendants, both lack the targeting capacity and coer-
cive and intrusive investigatory tools enjoyed by public prosecutors, and
both face sufficient financial constraints to reduce to a tolerable level the
inevitable risk that self-interested plaintiffs may initiate civil proceedings
even when the executive might believe litigation is unwarranted. In the
end, therefore, the policy-based and fairness-based values thought to un-
derlie the constitutional assignment of law enforcement authority to the
executive ought not require significant, let alone exclusive, control over
civil actions brought on behalf of the United States.
B. Private Representation of the Public Interest
Even if Article II permits litigants who are not completely accountable
to the executive branch to represent the United States in court, critics of
the qui tam concept also contend that such litigants must at least be gov-
ernment officers selected pursuant to the appointments clause.161 This rule
would assure both that the executive enjoy at least some oversight of pri-
vate litigants and that the interests of the United States not be defined by
self-interested individuals lacking a commitment to public values. But,
once again, it is difficult to discern a firm foundation in constitutional
values for this proposed rule against private litigation on behalf of the
United States.
The appointments clause does not specify the class of "Officers" whose
appointment it governs. It is well established that citizens litigating Fed-
eral causes of action to vindicate their own legal interests do not fall
within this class. Why must the same citizens be considered officers when
they purport to vindicate legal interests assigned to the national polity?
Concededly, the Supreme Court declared in Buckley v. Valeol6 2 that "pri-
mary responsibility for conducting civil litigation in the courts of the
United States for vindicating public rights. . . may be discharged only by
persons who are 'Officers of the United States' within the language of [the
appointments clause]." ' 3 But it is difficult to understand this declaration
as enshrining a public/private interest distinction governing the applica-
bility of the appointments clause.
To begin with, the scant case law defining the term "Officers" focuses
161. See supra note 79.
162. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
163. Id. at 140 (emphasis added).
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primarily on the extent, not the governmental nature, of the powers exer-
cised by a particular person. Buckley held that the appointments clause
prohibited Congress from appointing individuals to the Federal Elections
Commission (FEC) which, among other things, was authorized to bring
civil enforcement actions to encourage compliance with campaign fairness
regulations. Members of the FEC were deemed to be "Officers," not
merely by virtue of their litigation roles, but also due to their prescribed
tenure in an established office and their "primary responsibility" for law
enforcement. The Court has long held, however, that a person whose "po-
sition is without tenure, duration, continuing emolument, or continuous
duties [and who] acts only occasionally and temporarily" is more appro-
priately characterized as an "executive agent" rather than an "Officer" as
defined by the appointments clause.'"
Admittedly, because several of these attributes must be evaluated in rel-
ative terms, it is difficult to discern clear lines between agents and officers
from the Court's traditional interpretive test." 5 But compared to the FEC
members deemed to be officers in Buckley, qui tam plaintiffs enjoy signifi-
cantly less, and more ephemeral, authority. Particularly given the False
Claims Act's invitation for executive takeover of qui tam litigation, qui
tam plaintiffs are not readily characterized as enjoying "primary responsi-
bility" for enforcing the statutory scheme. More like citizens litigating
conventional private rights of action, individual qui tam litigants are
merely one-shot actors rather than tenured repeat players involved in the
ongoing implementation of Federal law. 66
The extent of litigation powers exercised by qui tam plaintiffs suggests
that, like conventional plaintiffs litigating private rights of action and un-
like members of the FEC, qui tam plaintiffs ought to be considered execu-
tive agents and not officers subject to the dictates of the appointments
164. Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890).
165. Indeed, in Morrison, the Court used the same attributes to draw lines between "inferior"
and "principal" officers for the purpose of classifying the independent counsel. See Morrison v. Olson,
108 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1988).
166. In Morrison, the Court assumed without analysis that an independent counsel appointed
pursuant to the Ethics Act is at least an inferior officer for appointments clause purposes, id. at 2608
n.12, though the counsel can also be characterized as a one-shot actor. But unlike a qui tam plaintiff,
an independent counsel enjoys sole responsibility for enforcing criminal law in specified contexts, is
publicly subsidized on a non-contingent basis, and may herself appoint new governmental employees
as well as command the aid of present Department of Justice employees in executing her statutory
powers. See id. at 2604.
Interestingly, the Court implied in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A., 107 S. Ct.
2124 (1987) that a one-time private contempt prosecutor who apparently, like a qui tam plaintiff,
cannot appoint or otherwise command the aid of subordinate executive agents is not an officer as
defined by the appointments clause. In Young, the Court ruled that a district court can "appoint" a
private prosecutor for a criminal contempt action despite the fact that Congress had provided no
statutory authorization for the practice. See id. at 2130 (considering but rejecting contention that Fed.
R. Crim. P. 42(b) purported to authorize such appointments). Such an "appointment" conforms to
the procedures prescribed by the appointments clause no more than does a qui tam plaintiff's self-
selection, though concededly such a non-authorized judicial appointment may uniquely serve to ensure
the competence of litigants representing the United States. See infra note 180.
1989]
The Yale Law Journal
clause. But does Buckley's unexplained declaration that civil litigation vin-
dicating "public rights" may be discharged only by governmental officers
mean that the nature of qui tam plaintiffs' function of representing the
public requires the contrary conclusion?
The separation of powers value identified by the Court in Buckley cer-
tainly does not support this latter reading. 6 ' The Court's primary con-
cern in Buckley was the avoidance of congressional aggrandizement of
power.'1 8 The Court stressed that Congress could not, through the guise
of appointing specific government officeholders, retain for itself any signif-
icant power to execute its own laws,' 69 and the concern motivated the
Court to declare broadly that "it is to the President, and not to the Con-
gress, that the Constitution entrusts the responsibility" of Federal law en-
forcement by seeking judicial relief.'71 But this concern is not triggered
here; qui tam plaintiffs are neither appointed by, removable by, nor be-
holden in any way to Congress.'
This worry aside, is some other important structural value served by
characterizing litigants on behalf of the United States as officers? One
might propose that the appointment of such litigants serves the President's
ability to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" by giving her
some role in selecting the United States' legal representatives. 7 2 But this
perspective does not easily justify a distinction between litigation on behalf
of public and private rights. As explained previously, the contention that
the take care clause (or any other provision of Article II) assigns to the
President an independent law enforcement function requiring her to enjoy
significantly greater control over the judicial vindication of public rather
167. Cf Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620, 624 (D. Md. 1987)
(Buckley "does not stand for the proposition ... that private persons may not enforce any Federal
laws simply because they are not Officers of the United States appointed in accordance with Article II
of the Constitution").
168. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 244-46 (2d ed. 1988).
169. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 139 (1976) (Congress may not "'enforce [the laws] or
appoint the agents charged with the duty of such enforcement' ") (quoting Springer v. Philippine
Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928)); see generally Buckley, 424 U.S. at 124-31 (discussing concern
about congressional aggrandizement); see also discussion supra note 83.
170. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 138. This general rule does not preclude Congress from participating to
some extent in Federal litigation. Congress (or the Houses separately) occasionally submits amicus
briefs in litigation defending the constitutionality or proposing a particular construction of its own
statutes.
171. Cf, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2620-21 (1988) (despite Congress' power to
request that Attorney General apply for appointment of independent counsel under Ethics in Govern-
ment Act, "Congress retained for itself no powers of control or supervision over an independent coun-
sel" and therefore Act "simply does not pose a 'dange[r] of congressional usurpation of Executive
Branch functions' ") (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986)); Natural Resources De-
fense Council v. Outboard Marine Corp., 692 F. Supp. 801, 816 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (in traditional
citizens' suit pursuant to Clean Water Act, "there is no possibility here of private litigants being
subject to congressional control").
172. The Court suggested a link between the take care and the appointments clauses in Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 164 (1926) (noting that President's "power of appointment and removal
of executive officers . . . [is] confirmed by his [take Care] obligation").
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than private civil statutory obligations is quite weak."7 3 And, in any case,
the specific procedures of the appointments clause are particularly ill-
designed for this proposed oversight function. For example, since Congress
can choose to vest the power to appoint inferior officers 17 4 in Federal
judges,7 5 the degree of presidential accountability actually secured by the
appointment power is often extremely attenuated both by distance (judges'
independence makes it difficult to hold presidents accountable for judges'
appointment decisions) and by time (judges' life tenure often means that
those making appointments will not themselves have been appointed by
the current President).
17 6
Moreover, the take care clause is better understood as a directive that
the President must execute the law consistently with Congress' will,
rather than as a grant of exogenously defined power,17 7 and the power of
appointment is not necessary to ensure qui tam plaintiffs' faithful obser-
vance of their statutory role. For the most part, qui tam litigants serve
their statutorily defined function merely by bringing actions and prosecut-
ing them zealously in order to advance their own pecuniary interests. To
the extent that the False Claims Act imposes particular limits on qui tam
plaintiffs' conduct, the Act provides the executive with specific means of
enforcing such limits.' Thus, self-selection of litigants does not in any
significant sense hamper the executive's ability to "take Care" that con-
gressional goals are fulfilled through execution of the law; indeed, self-
selection is designed specifically to ensure fulfillment of congressionally
defined objectives.'
1 9
173. See supra text accompanying notes 89-131. To the extent the nature of qui tam litigation
requires any greater executive oversight than traditional citizens' suit litigation, such oversight is pro-
vided by provisions of the Act itself and need not be secured through the executive's appointment of
qui tam litigants. See supra notes 96, 131.
174. At most, qui tam plaintiffs can be characterized as inferior, not principal, officers. Cf. Morri-
son, 108 S. Ct. at 2608-09 (independent counsel is inferior officer).
175. See id. at 2610-11.
176. Indeed, the Court in Morrison made no reference to the appointment power as a means of
ensuring presidential oversight of law enforcement activity, even while holding that the "take Care"
clause requires that the President "retain[] ample authority to assure that [an independent counsel] is
competently performing her statutory responsibilities in a manner that comports with the provisions of
the [statute being enforced]." Id. at 2619.
177. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(c)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1989) (DOJ may move to curtail private
plaintiff's participation where it would "interfere with or unduly delay" DOJ's prosecution of case).
179. See L. TRIBE, supra note 168, at 253 (scope of take care "'duty is necessarily limited' by the
substantive and structural content of the laws Congress enacts") (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 762 (1986) (White, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added).
For the same reason, the take care clause does not require the President to have removal power over
a qui tam litigant with whose prosecution decision and litigation strategy the President disagrees;
presidential removal in such cases would frustrate, not "faithfully execute," the congressional design.
In any event, at the very most the President's take care duty entails a power of removal only "for good
cause," not "at will." See Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2619-20. The DOJ's ability under the False
Claims Act to dismiss a particular qui tam suit, see supra notes 56, 131, provides far more than the
functional equivalent of termination "for cause" since it results in the termination of the proceeding,
not merely in the replacement of one litigant with another.
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Finally, the appointments clause challenge to qui tam actions may re-
flect the belief that, completely apart from securing a minimal level of
executive control, conformity with appointments clause procedures would
ensure that prosecutors representing the United States will be "qualified"
to do so.'80 But whether self-selection of public interest litigants precludes
constitutionally satisfactory representation turns on the necessity of any
particular qualifications. With respect to prosecutorial competence, Con-
gress has decided that qui tam plaintiffs' possession of otherwise publicly
unattainable information about false claims practices makes them suffi-
ciently (indeed uniquely) qualified to bring suit, and their pecuniary in-
terest in enforcement makes them sufficiently zealous to allow them to
litigate (through private attorneys) on behalf of the United States:
"[H]old[ing] out . . . a strong temptation . . . is the safest and most ex-
peditious way . . .of bringing rogues to justice." '181
One might also object that only publicly appointed prosecutors will
truly "represent" the best interests of the United States, whereas self-
selected qui tam plaintiffs will likely focus primarily on their own pecuni-
ary and potentially competing motives."82 But now we have come full cir-
cle. Of course, if one defines a priori the policy-based "interests of the
United States" to be those defined by the President, then qui tam plain-
tiffs likely will not adequately "represent" their client.18 But, as con-
cluded earlier, no independent executive law enforcement power precludes
Congress from authorizing private citizens to participate in the process of
defining the United States' interests, with the congressionally intended re-
sult of strengthening the United States' commitment to particular law en-
180. Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 455 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (presidential
nomination creates "great probability of having the [office] supplied by a man of abilities, at least
respectable").
While Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A., 107 S. Ct. 2124 (1987), upheld judicial
appointment of contempt prosecutors despite a failure to satisfy appointments clause procedures, see
supra note 166 and accompanying text, arguably judicial appointment of prosecutors at least serves
the goal of securing competent legal representation.
181. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 995-96 (1863) (statement of Sen. Howard); see also
United States ex reL Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.5 (1943) (observing that qui tam plaintiffs
may be zealous representatives of United States' interests, not because of laudable concern for public
interest, but rather because of " 'the strong stimulus of personal ill will or the hope of gain' ") (quot-
ing United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. Or. 1885)); cf. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S
238, 249 (1980) ("state legislature 'may, and often ought to, stimulate prosecutions for crime by
offering to those who shall initiate and carry on such prosecutions rewards for thus acting in the
interest of the State and the people' ") (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927)).
It is worth noting that, while qui tam plaintiffs are unlikely to be repeat litigants, their private
attorneys are likely to be experienced civil litigators and perhaps even false claims specialists. Cf
supra note 88. In general, the competence of such attorneys probably compares favorably with that of
Department of Justice attorneys despite their different institutional environments. See supra text ac-
companying note 135.
182. See supra note 148 (observing that Young may be understood to raise similar concern).
183. Note that this potential for inadequate representation is by no means unique to private liti-
gants. As suggested earlier, see supra note 28, executive branch challenges to the constitutionality of
Federal statutes prompt the identical concern because the executive appears to represent its own insti-
tutional interests irrespective of the overall interests of the polity.
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forcement objectives. Hence, by constitutionally permissible congressional
definition, qui tam plaintiffs do adequately represent their sovereign client
even if they simultaneously pursue personal ends.
Moreover, this concern about adequate representation is not easily
cabined to qui tam actions. I have focused my comments on litigation "on
behalf of the United States" in the specific sense that the United States
represents the public and it is the public's legal rights being vindicated.
But private litigation may implicate the policy interests of the United
States in a variety of other ways. For example, traditional citizens' suits,
while conceptually brought to vindicate personal rights, are designed by
Congress to secure public policy objectives. Indeed, certain such citizens'
suits allow private citizens to seek monetary penalties payable solely to the
Federal treasury,"" and private suits seeking punitive damage awards
serve the sovereign's interest in punishing and deterring aggravated mis-
conduct.' If the Constitution prohibits self-interested private plaintiffs
from litigating on behalf of the United States in the sense underlying qui
tam actions (i.e., representation of the United States' legal interest), why
not in any or all of these other policy senses as well?
Finally, the Supreme Court has declared occasionally that the United
States' overriding interest in law enforcement is not to "win a case, but [to
see] that justice shall be done,"' 86 and one might worry that self-interested
private plaintiffs might not prove faithful to this norm. But this norm
reflects a commitment to due process values, and such values are seriously
threatened by potentially overzealous prosecution only in cases involving
government-initiated prosecutions, particularly of criminal offenses.18 7
The norm "justice over victory" responds to concerns triggered by the gov-
ernment's institutional involvement-not the United States' sovereign in-
terest-in the litigation, 8 and therefore the norm ought not govern qui
tam representation.' 89
At bottom, the contention that only disinterested prosecutors (secured
by appointments clause observance) will adequately represent the interests
184. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1365(a)(1), 1319(d) (West
Supp. 1989) (civil fines up to S25,000 per day per violation).
185. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1902 (1989).
186. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
87 (1963) ("[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair").
But see Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980) ("[pirosecutors need not be entirely
'neutral and detached' . . . [and] are necessarily permitted to be zealous in their enforcement of the
law") (quoting Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 62 (1972)); Berger, 295 U.S. at 88
(public prosecutor "may prosecute with earnestness and vigor").
187. See supra text accompanying notes 149-60.
188. Cf. supra note 157 (distinguishing between United States' involvement in litigation as juridi-
cal as opposed to institutional entity for purposes of applying various legal rules).
189. In contrast, both Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 2608 n.12 (1988), characterizing an
independent special counsel as an inferior officer, and Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils
S.A., 107 S.Ct. 2124, 2130, impliedly characterizing a judicially appointed contempt prosecutor as an
agent not governed by the appointments clause, see supra note 166, trigger this normative concern.
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of the United States reflects simply a disagreement with Congress over its
definition of optimal enforcement of particular statutory obligations. Since
no Article II values appear to prohibit Congress from defining the United
States' litigation interests through privately prosecuted civil suits, and
since empowering private citizens to volunteer as litigation representatives
for the United States contravenes no identifiable independent structural
values secured by the appointments clause, we are left with the conclusion
that, at least with respect to Article II, "Congress has power to choose this
method to protect the government from burdens fraudulently imposed
upon it ... "190
The only remaining constitutional concern is whether Article III values
preclude Federal courts from facilitating this congressionally prescribed
process of defining the interests of the United States by entertaining and
adjudicating qui tam suits.
III. Qui TAM ACTIONS AND ARTICLE III
The Article III challenge to the qui tam concept contends that qui tam
plaintiffs lack standing because they have not suffered an injury in fact
sufficiently "distinct and palpable" to be judicially cognizable.19' As is ap-
parent from the present disarray of modern standing doctrine,192 however,
these terms are not self-defining. Particularly "with respect to nontradi-
tional forms of litigation,"' 93 "[d]etermining Art[icle] III's 'uncertain and
shifting contours' . ..requires reference to the purposes of the case-or-
controversy requirement."' 94
The Supreme Court has recently suggested that "the law of Art[icle] III
standing is built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of pow-
ers." 95 Two separate strands of this theme emerge from recent cases.
First, standing doctrine secures judicial competence by "limit[ing] the bus-
iness of Federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and
in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial
process." 98 Second, standing doctrine precludes judicial aggrandizement
of power by "defin[ing] the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite
190. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 542 (1943).
191. A plaintiff seeking to invoke the power of a Federal court must have suffered a "distinct and
palpable" "injury in fact" which is fairly traceable to the alleged misconduct of the defendant and
which can be redressed by available and appropriate judicial relief. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Beyond these constitutional requirements, prudence dictates that courts gener-
ally ought not allow even injured parties to assert the rights of others or to seek judicial redress for
"generalized grievances" more appropriately addressed by the representative branches. Id.
192. See, e.g., Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 228-50 (1988).
193. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402 (1980) (citation omitted).
194. Id. (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 87 (1968)).
195. Allen, 468 U.S. at 752.
196. Flast, 392 U.S. at 95.
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allocation of power to assure that the Federal courts will not intrude into
areas committed to the other branches of government." '197
At the outset, I confess a general agreement with recent scholarship
suggesting that modern standing doctrine lacks a coherent conceptual
foundation and that, with limited exceptions not applicable here,1"8 Arti-
cle III standing requirements ought to be considered satisfied whenever
the plaintiff seeking to invoke the Federal judicial power asserts a cause of
action pursuant to a congressional statute.'99 According to this view, qui
tam plaintiffs clearly possess standing. But one need not go this far to
defend the qui tam concept. Not only have qui tam actions been "histori-
cally viewed as capable of [judicial] resolution" for over two hundred
years, but the unique structure of qui tam litigation comfortably secures
the various values presently said to underlie modern standing doctrine.
A. Judicial Competence
The Supreme Court has frequently proclaimed that "[t]he imperatives
of a dispute capable of judicial resolution are sharply presented issues in a
concrete factual setting and self-interested parties vigorously advocating
opposing positions."2 ' The injury in fact requirement secures these at-
tributes of an Article III case by requiring that "the party seeking relief
• ..'allege[] such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
")201
Since qui tam statutes impose penalties for specific misconduct, all suits
under such statutes (perhaps as opposed to ones asserting causes of action
under vague constitutional provisions) satisfy the "imperative" that issues
be presented in a "concrete factual setting." Specifically, the submission to
the government of false claims for payment creates a concretely fact-bound
legal controversy between the miscreant and the United States. Hence the
United States has standing to sue the defendant; the only question here is
197, Id. While the Court has never expressly acknowledged this fact, these two articulated strands
of standing doctrine neatly track the separation of powers inquiry triggered by interbranch disputes.
First, does Congress' qui tam authorization impair Federal courts' ability to function properly? See,
e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2621 (1988) (inquiring whether particular statute "imper-
missibly undermine[s]" the powers of another branch or prevents it "from accomplishing its constitu-
tionally assigned functions") (citations omitted). Second, does Congress' qui tam authorization aggran-
dize judicial power at the expense of the other two branches? See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 109
S. Ct. 647, 659 (1989) (inquiring whether statute "accrete[s] to a single branch powers more appro-
priately diffused among separate branches").
198. See infra note 217.
199. See, e.g., Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 41; Fletcher, supra note
192, at 253-54; Sunstein, supra note 24, at 1461-80; cf. Amar, Law Story (Book Review), 102
HARV. L. REv. 688, 717-19 (1989) (generalizing same point to other Article III doctrines such as
ripeness and mootness).
200. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 403 (1980).
201. Flast, 392 U.S. at 99 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
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whether a qui tam plaintiff is a proper party to invoke the Federal judi-
cial power as the United States' representative.
Congress' decision to embrace qui tam plaintiffs as the United States'
legal champions by itself requires an affirmative answer. The United
States requires some agent to act on its behalf. While Congress usually
assigns this responsibility to attorneys within the Department of Justice,
other executive or independent agencies,"20 or even to private attorneys
hired by the government,20 3 qui tam statutes simply "enable a private
party to invoke the standing of the government to collect a civil pen-
alty.' '204 Whether the action is brought by one of the United States' public
or private agents, the action presents a case or controversy in the same
manner as if the suit were brought by the United States itself.
Defendants presently challenging qui tam standing maintain that pri-
vate citizens lack a sufficient "personal stake" in the controversy to ensure
their zealous advocacy of the public interest. But, even if the Court's focus
on "personal stake" in early standing decisions was ever intended to serve
such a purpose, more recent developments make it clear that the "essence
of standing 'is not a question of motivation [for zealous advocacy] but of
possession of the requisite . . . interest that is, or is threatened to be,
injured .. ' "205 Not only does the Court's treatment of plaintiffs'
standing to vindicate statutorily defined private interests underscore this
view, 206 but-more to the point here-none of the United States' more
common legal representatives, such as Department of Justice attorneys,
enjoy a "personal stake" in the outcome of their litigation in any pecuni-
202. See generally Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government's Chief Lawyer and
Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 1049, 1057 (1978) (thirty-one execu-
tive branch and independent agencies are authorized to conduct at least some litigation on behalf of
United States).
203. See, e.g., Federal Debt Collection Practices Act, 31 U.S.C.A. § 3718 (West Supp. 1989)
(private attorneys hired by contract); Farm Credit Amendments Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 2244(c) (West
Supp. 1989) (private attorneys "designated" by Farm Board).
204. 13A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
3531.13 (1984); see supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text (qui tam plaintiff best characterized as
legal representative of United States).
205. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
454 U.S. 464, 486 n.21 (1982) (quoting Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 435 (1952)); see
also Scalia, supra note 92, at 891 ("if the purpose of standing is 'to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues,' the doctrine is remarkably ill designed for its end") (quot-
ing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
206. The Court has long held that Congress can legislatively create an interest whose invasion
constitutes an injury sufficient to confer standing, even where no such cognizable injury previously
existed. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975); see supra text accompanying note 15.
But as an empirical matter, Congress' determination that the interest should be protected does not
somehow magically enhance the adversarial zeal of a private plaintiff asserting that interest. Compare,
e.g., Warth, 422 U.S. at 512 (asserted interest in "living in a racially and ethnically integrated com-
munity" not judicially cognizable) with Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212
(1972) (statutorily created interest in same is judicially cognizable).
For this reason, the Court's admonition in Warth that a plaintiff asserting a statutory interest "still
must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself," 422 U.S. at 501, is most sensibly understood as
evincing concern for judicial encroachment on the prerogatives of the other branches, see infra notes
218-21 and accompanying text, rather than concern for judicial competence.
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ary or other traditional sense.2" 7 Rather, it is the concrete adversarial rela-
tionship between the defendant and the United States created by the de-
fendant's alleged invasion of the United States' legal interests, not any
relationship between the defendant and the United States' particular legal
representative, that is sufficient to confer standing.2 "
In any case, a qui tam plaintiff's entitlement to share in monetary re-
covery gives the plaintiff a personal stake in the litigation and provides
strong motivation for vigorous prosecution. To be sure, this observation
meets with the objection that the plaintiff's interest in the litigation arises
from the structure of the litigation itself and not from the defendant's mis-
conduct. For example, the Court held in Diamond v. Charles °9 that an
intervenor lacked standing to appeal an adverse decision on the merits
despite a clear pecuniary interest in avoiding his erstwhile duty to pay his
opponents' attorneys fees; an adverse fee award was not a judicially cogni-
zable injury because "[tihe fee award is wholly unrelated to the subject
matter of the litigation. '21 0 But a qui tam plaintiff's monetary stake in the
outcome of litigation is not similarly unrelated to the underlying contro-
versy. Rather, the civil recovery in which the successful qui tam plaintiff
shares consists of the damages and penalties assessed the defendant be-
cause of the latter's illegal conduct. In this respect, the plaintiff's personal
stake fairly resembles that created by a "partial assignment" of the under-
lying claim from the United States to her, in return for her being the first
qui tam litigant asserting the claim.
211
207. Indeed, as discussed earlier, public prosecutors wielding the formidable investigative and
prosecutorial powers of the government should not have any such personal relationship to the litiga-
tion. See supra text accompanying notes 146-48.
208. Even Justice Harlan, no friend of liberal court access rules, recognized that "individual liti-
gants have standing [as parties] to represent the public interest, despite their lack of economic or other
personal interests, if Congress has appropriately authorized such suits." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
131 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
209. 476 U.S. 54 (1986).
210. Id. at 70. The Court seemed to hold that the intervenor's interest failed to constitute an
adequate "injury" because it was collateral to the underlying dispute. See id. at 70-71 ("[The mere
fact that continued adjudication would provide a remedy for an injury that is only a byproduct of the
suit itself does not mean that the injury is cognizable under Art. III."). It seems to me that, to the
extent collaterality of factual injury is a concern, it is more appropriately considered part of the
inquiry whether the plaintiff's asserted injury is "fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful
conduct." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
In any case, the Court has frequently found standing to exist even when the litigant's asserted
injury arose as a by-product of, and not as the progenitor of, the suit. See, e.g., ASARCO v. Kadish,
109 S. Ct. 2037 (1989) (Court has jurisdiction to review state court judgment despite original plain-
tiffs' failure to assert sufficiently distinct and palpable injury to satisfy Article III standing require-
ments, reasoning that petitioners (original defendants) appealing adverse state court judgment suffered
concrete injury from that adverse judgment).
Moreover, since the collateral nature of a pecuniary interest in the outcome of litigation in no way
affects the plaintiff's incentive for zealous advocacy, Diamond reinforces my view that the Court's
continuing reference to "personal stake" can sensibly be read as referring only to a litigant's legal, not
factual, interest in the controversy. See supra text accompanying notes 205-08.
211. I offer this as a helpful analogy only, not suggesting that Congress actually intended to
assign the United States' claims in the conventional sense. I note, however, that claims for economic
injuries have traditionally been viewed as freely assignable by mutual agreement to non-injured as-
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Finally, the focus of contemporary standing doctrine on "distinct and
palpable" injury also "reflects a due regard for the autonomy of those
most likely to be affected by a judicial decision." '12 To protect this auton-
omy, "the decision to seek [judicial] review must be placed 'in the hands of
those who have a direct stake in the outcome.' "213 But concerns for third-
party autonomy have no place here. It is axiomatic that no individual
member of the public has a greater interest at stake in public rights litiga-
tion than does the actual plaintiff, so a denial of standing to the latter can
hardly be thought necessary to protect the autonomy of the former. Sec-
ond, while arguably the United States can be viewed as an entity whose
''autonomy" is more directly affected by litigation than the autonomy of
any given private plaintiff, Congress has already declared that qui tam
plaintiffs shall be deemed to represent, not compromise, the interests of
the United States such that the autonomy of the latter is not threatened.21 4
signees. See, e.g., Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Klamath Medical Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d
1276, 1282-83 (9th Cir. 1983) (upholding assignability of treble damages claims under Federal anti-
trust statutes); In re Fine Paper Litigation, 632 F.2d 1081, 1090 (3d Cir. 1980) (upholding partial
assignability of same). And the force of this analogy is not undermined by the fact that the precise
share received by the plaintiff for successfully prosecuting the United States' claim is judicially deter-
mined from within fixed statutory ranges. There is nothing extraordinary about the fact that the
consideration received by the plaintiff for her service to the United States is contingent on the need for
and quality of that service. Nor is the force of this analogy undermined by the fact that the posited
"assignment" is effectuated by, and not prior to, the plaintiff's filing suit. Congress' inability to iden-
tify in advance the appropriate qui tam relator for an as-yet-unknown fraud demands its use of a
unilateral contractual offer.
212. Diamond, 476 U.S. at 62.
213. Id. (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972)); see also Valley Forge Chris-
tian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982)
("standing [doctrine] also reflects a due regard for the autonomy of those persons likely to be most
directly affected by a judicial order").
In Diamond, the Court decided that the State of Illinois, which chose not to appeal the appellate
court's invalidation of its abortion statute, was much more directly interested in the controversy than
was the private intervenor. Therefore, granting the intervenor standing to defend the statute through
further appeal would be inconsistent with due "concerns for state autonomy." 476 U.S. at 65.
214. Since Congress can override the prudential standing rule which generally precludes plaintiffs
from vindicating interests more directly affecting other private individuals, see, e.g., Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975), it follows that Congress may similarly waive the prudential standing bar-
rier on behalf of the United States. Cf. Diamond, 476 U.S. at 65 n.17 (suggesting Illinois legislature
could have created an interest sufficient to confer private standing to defend the constitutionality of its
abortion statute).
One might suggest (though the Supreme Court never has) that Article III standing requirements
also serve to protect the autonomy of potential defendants; individuals may be sued in Federal court
(and thus forced to expend energy and resources in defense) only after having engaged in conduct
which can fairly be alleged to injure another member of society. Cf. supra text accompanying notes
132-35 (protection of individuals from prosecutorial overreaching constitutes value underlying Article
II separation of powers doctrines). But any standing limits appropriately inspired by this perspective
turn on a normative inquiry about the importance of redressing particular injuries: What "injuries"
are sufficiently deserving of protection as to justify subjecting people allegedly causing them to civil
suits? I believe this value judgment ought to be left to Congress. Cf. Fletcher, supra note 192, at 233
(judicial refusal to entertain legislatively defined interests constitutes form of unwarranted "substan-
tive due process"). But in any case, I see no justification for distinguishing as a categorical matter
between "public" and "private" injuries for purposes of this analysis. Indeed, individuals arguably
ought to be subject to prosecution more easily for "public" than "private" injuries because of the more
widespread impact of such misconduct. Moreover, qui tam schemes subject defendants to less potential
abuse than traditional citizens' suit schemes, because for any given misconduct a defendant may have
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B. Judicial Encroachment on the Prerogatives of the Representative
Branches
Because qui tam actions satisfy the "imperatives of a dispute capable of
judicial resolution" '215 and do not undermine the autonomy of interested
nonparties, qui tam standing fully comports with Article III values unless
it fails to respect the "'properly limited. . . role of the courts in a demo-
cratic society.' ""' But judicial cognizance of congressionally authorized
private litigation to redress "generalized grievances" arising from private
misconduct does not transgress any such limits.21
Since few private actors are positioned to create "generalized griev-
ances" by injuring the public at large, the Court's reluctance to resolve
such disputes finds expression in cases involving challenges to congres-
sional or executive action. Adjudication of such challenges arguably
threatens to disturb the delicate relationship between the judicial and
other branches.2"8 But neither this reason to view adjudication "as a tool
of last resort" 29 nor the related desire to avoid unnecessary adjudication
of constitutional issues220 counsels against judicial cognizance of statutory
claims privately litigated on behalf of the government against private de-
fendants, no matter how "generalized" the underlying interest at stake.221
to defend herself against numerous citizens' suits but only one qui tam suit. See supra note 71 (noting
statutory bar against multiple qui tam prosecutions).
215. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 403 (1980).
216. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498
(1975)).
217. In rare contexts, a general grievance may arise from Congress' performance of a non-
legislative function, such as Senate confirmation of public officers' appointments. A congressional
grant of private standing to litigate the constitutionality or erstwhile propriety of Congress' exercise of
such non-legislative functions arguably represents an attempt by Congress to abdicate its assigned
functions by transferring them to the judiciary. See, e.g., McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265 (D.
Idaho) (refusing to grant standing based on statute expressly authorizing members of Congress to
litigate validity of Senate's confirmation of Abner Mikva to Federal bench despite arguable violation
of ineligibility clause), affd mem. sub nom. McClure v. Reagan, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981). Congres-
sional grants of standing to enforce statutes ordering private conduct neither raise this concern nor the
related one of impermissibly seeking an advisory judicial opinion. Cf Muskrat v. United States, 219
U.S. 346, 357 (1911) (Congress lacks power to seek advisory judicial opinions).
218. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring)):
[R]epeated and essentially head-on confrontations between the life-tenured branch and the rep-
resentative branches of government will not, in the long run, be beneficial to either. The public
confidence essential to the former and the vitality critical to the latter may well erode if we do
not exercise self-restraint in the utilization of our power to negative the actions of the other
branches.
219. Id.; cf Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974) (adjudi-
cation of "important constitutional issues in the abstract would ... open the Judiciary to an arguable
charge of providing 'government by injunction' ").
220. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
221. Indeed, in the context of statutory claims against private defendants, the only possible "head-
on confrontation" between the courts and Congress consists of the courts' refusal to accept a congres-
sionally defined legal interest as an acceptable basis for standing. At bottom, judicial refusal to ac-
knowledge standing under these circumstances limits Congress' ability to create new legal interests
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The only sense in which the nature of the underlying interest might be
relevant is that judicial resolution of generalized grievances might be
viewed as entailing a judicial definition of the interests of the United
States. As articulated by now-Justice Scalia, courts are "specifically
designed to be bad at" resolving disputes over majoritarian interests.222
Therefore, courts should be restricted by standing doctrine to "their tradi-
tional undemocratic role of protecting individuals and minorities against
impositions of the majority," 223 and excluded from "the even more un-
democratic role of prescribing how the other two branches should function
in order to serve the interest of the majority itself.
' '22 4
But this contention, even if persuasive,22 is inapposite here; courts en-
tertaining qui tam actions do not themselves decide how best to serve the
United States' interests. Rather, those interests are defined by other public
and private actors. As discussed earlier, the congressional scheme supple-
menting executive enforcement with qui tam litigation creates a shared,
operational definition of the "interests of the United States" compatible
with Article II values; judicial cognizance of qui tam actions under the
statutorily specified circumstances serves to implement, not frustrate, this
definition of the public interest. The adjudicating court is not required to
make its own policy determinations to any significant degree about how
best to serve the public interest-for example, by dictating the executive
branch's deployment of scarce resources or its exercise of prosecutorial
discretion.22  Rather, it merely follows congressional orders and adjudi-
supplementing those recognized at common law-a form of Lochnerism all over again. See Fletcher,
supra note 192, at 233; cf. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873 (1987) (discussing
role of common law baselines in standing and other areas of public law).
222. Scalia, supra note 92, at 896 (emphasis in original).
223. Id. at 894.
224. Id. (emphasis in original); see United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188-89 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring).
225. Without disputing that courts are the least "democratic" of the three branches, but see, e.g.,
Choper, The Supreme Court and the Political Branches: Democratic Theory and Practice, 122 U.
PA. L. REV. 810, 817-46 (1974) (cataloging ways in which Congress is undemocratic), it is worth
noting that the assumption underlying the Court's "generalized grievance" standing bar-that the
legislature and executive are likely to respond in an accountable fashion to the perceived grievance
given its generalized nature-ignores much political science literature concerning the collective action
problems facing political movements seeking redress for ubiquitous and intangible injuries. See gener-
ally M. OLSON, THE LoGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971); Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 7, at
1227. This concern may explain why Justice Scalia appears to limit the application of his reasoning
to widely shared "concrete injur[ies]" as opposed to abstract ones, see Scalia, supra note 92, at 895,
though he does not expressly acknowledge the above critique.
Moreover, the assumption of executive accountability is particularly weak where, as here, Congress
has specifically found that the executive cannot respond adequately to the grievance without the aid of
private informers. See supra text accompanying notes 42-51. And the executive cannot easily be held
publicly accountable for refusing to prosecute apparent violations of which it does become aware, since
ordinarily the public will not learn of its decision and motives therefor, particularly if those motives
are considered improper. See supra text accompanying note 48.
226. Cf. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (judicial review of criminal
prosecutorial discretion disfavored because courts are "particularly ill-suited" to make necessary policy
judgments). Indeed, this challenge to judicial cognizance of generalized grievances applies much more
forcefully to conventional "private rights of initiation" than to qui tam actions.
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cates the controversy presented to it under the congressionally defined sub-
stantive law.227
In sum, none of the structural or substantive values claimed to underlie
contemporary standing doctrine argues persuasively against judicial cogni-
zance of qui tam actions, despite their failure to redress "distinct and pal-
pable" private injuries. The unique structure of qui tam litigation both
guarantees the functional requisites of a judicially resolvable concrete con-
troversy and avoids the need for any impermissible judicial participation
in the project of defining the interests of the United States.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because the False Claims Act was originally signed by President Lin-
coln and became popularly known as the "Abraham Lincoln Law,"22 it
is fitting that his words so aptly describe the present quandary about the
appropriate roles to be played by the United States' institutional agents
and private citizens in defining and implementing its interests: "If we
could first know where we are, and whither we are tending, we could
better judge what to do, and how to do it." '229 Various snippets of doctrine,
fleshed out by intuitions derived from modern practice, tend to suggest
227. To be sure, the governing substantive law may in certain instances leave substantial room for
judicial discretion. For example, the False Claims Act does not specify a substantive norm governing
dismissal of qui tam actions upon motion by the Department of Justice. But even should the legisla-
tive history provide insufficient guidance as to Congress' intended standard, but see supra note 131, it
seems to me that a court could easily avoid any charge of usurping executive discretion by embracing
a clearly legal standard such as "arbitrariness" or even "good faith." Cf Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.
Ct. 2597, 2620 n.33 (1988) (judicial review of President's removal of officer for "good cause" merely
implements "will of Congress" and does "not inject the Judicial Branch into the removal decision").
In any case, even should delegation of highly discretionary decisions to courts be considered a diffi-
culty of constitutional magnitude, it is one that arises not from the qui tam enforcement provisions,
but from the substantive law itself. Indeed, other statutes enforceable only by executive officials raise
this difficulty more directly. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 16(e) (West Supp. 1989) (court can enter consent
judgment proposed by United States in antitrust action only after finding that it serves "public inter-
est"); 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(m)(3) (West Supp. 1989) (FTC settlements of unfair competition actions
require court approval); 30 U.S.C. § 820(k) (1982) (Mine Safety Commission settlements of penalty
actions require court approval). But see Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001, 1004-06 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting from summary affirmance) (suggesting that "legal" determination of "pub-
lic interest" really involves judicial policymaking better performed by and hence appropriately left to
the executive). Authorization of qui tam suits may increase the frequency of occasions in which a
court exercises some control over the disposition of suits brought on behalf of the United States, but
the identity of the plaintiff does not affect the nature of the court's reviewing function. Hence this
concern speaks to the wisdom, not the constitutionality, of whatever procedural and substantive limits
are imposed by the Act on the executive's ability to dismiss or settle qui tam cases.
More generally, the fact that the qui tam structure creates the possibility of simultaneous prosecu-
tion by two plaintiffs who might disagree as to law or strategy poses no unique concerns about judicial
oversight of executive discretion. Courts frequently confront this two-plaintiff situation after the gov-
ernment intervenes in a private lawsuit to represent the United States' interests, and no court has
seriously suggested that whatever "refereeing" case management may entail under such circumstances
constitutes an impermissible judicial intrusion into the executive's exclusive domain. See supra note
103.
228. See 132 CONG. REC. H6479 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Glickman).
229. A. LINCOLN, Acceptance Speech to the Republican Convention (June 16, 1858), in ABIRA-
HAM LINCOLN: His SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 372 (R. Basler ed. 1946) (emphasis in original).
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that Congress cannot authorize and Federal courts cannot entertain pri-
vate litigation on behalf of the United States. But, after a more careful
inquiry into "whither we are tending" with contemporary Article II and
Article III doctrines, it appears that the qui tam concept, particularly as
structured in the present False Claims Act, comports with the values lying
beneath. Authorizing private citizens to enforce the United States' legal
interests through qui tam actions, no less than authorizing citizens to en-
force their own legislatively created interests as an indirect means of im-
plementing public policy objectives, is within Congress' power to "judge
what to do, and how to do it."
23 0
To many, the qui tam concept may seem an anachronistic vestige of an
earlier time when, prior to the growth of the modern executive, the re-
sponsibility for enforcing legal obligations necessarily fell to private citi-
zens rather than public officers. But when contemporary values support
the constitutional legitimacy of a once robust and routine law enforcement
scheme, the decision as to whether that scheme deserves burial or resur-
rection properly lies with Congress. 3 1 Perhaps it is somewhat prophetic
that McCulloch v. Maryland,2  in which the Supreme Court articulated
a strong reluctance to interpret the Constitution's structural provisions to
"deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to ex-
ercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances,"
2 33
resolved a controversy litigated by a private plaintiff in a qui tam
action.'"
230. Id. (emphasis in original).
231. To the extent one believes that contemporary legislative views of expediency do not justify
the constitutionality of novel structural modifications of interbranch relationships, see, e.g., Mistretta
v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 683 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("in the long run the improvisa-
tion of a constitutional structure on the basis of currently perceived utility will be disastrous"), one
ought equally to believe that an absence of need for a particular structure previously thought legiti-
mate does not erase its longstanding constitutional imprimatur. Cf. United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 547 (1943) (rejecting executive's argument that qui tam jurisdiction must be
interpreted narrowly because "conditions have changed since the Act was passed in 1863").
232. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
233. Id. at 415.
234. Id. at 321-22 (private action of debt brought against officer of United States Bank to recover
monetary penalty imposed by Maryland for avoiding state tax, said penalty to be recovered "one half
to the informer, and the other half to the use of the State").
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